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Leveraging Pharma to Lower Premiums: 
Medical Loss Ratio Regulation 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 Many recognize escalating drug prices as a significant dilemma 
related to America’s rising healthcare costs. Yet few can agree on what to 
do about them. Unaffordable drug prices are a result of many complex 
forces. One theory to address this problem is to reduce all government 
intervention and let normal market forces act as they usually do to bring 
the goods’ prices down to consumer-friendly ranges. However, the pre-
scription drug market is not, and perhaps never can be, a normal market. 
Reasons for this include (1) a lack of price transparency, (2) information 
and control asymmetries between patients and physicians, (3) third-party 
payors, (4) demand that remains constant irrespective of any exorbitant 
price increases (i.e., market inelasticity), and (5) patent-ensured mono-
polies. These factors disrupt the normal market forces that usually 
maintain prices at levels amenable to the general public (i.e., price equi-
librium). Left unchecked, Big Pharma increase their prices partly to pay 
for elevated marketing and other expenses and partly to recoup greater 
earnings. Consequently, they rake in substantial profits—at an average 
greater than any other industry. Thus, rising drug prices burden not only 
those who need them but also those who are expected to help pay for them. 
 To right this abnormal market, this Note suggests an alternative 
theory: that Congress should apply a medical loss ratio framework to the 
pharmaceutical drug industry, similar to the ratio framework applied to 
reform the health insurance industry. This framework seeks to balance 
corporate profits with consumer benefits by separating profits and “other” 
less value-adding expenses from those that add greater value to the 
consumer (i.e., “medical loss”). In the health insurance industry’s 80:20 
ratio framework, if the less value-adding expenses (e.g., profits, sales and 
marketing) cross the ratio threshold (20%), then the companies must 
reimburse the excess back to the consumer. This measure has eased some 
insurance premium increases. Similar reform is needed in the pharma-
ceutical industry, as currently the industry averages 21% profit—
significantly above that of other industries—while also spending around 
23% on sales and marketing and around 30% on manufacturing. 
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Therefore, the average medical loss ratio is roughly 30:70 (30% on medical 
loss and 70% on less value-adding areas). Imposing a stricter ratio 
threshold, such as 40:60, would provide some much-needed incentives for 
drug companies to reduce their lesser-value-adding expenses and, as a 
result, reduce drug prices. If Big Pharma failed to meet the 40% threshold, 
then the excess would be returned to the consumer. Imposing a medical 
loss ratio regulation in the pharmaceutical industry is a promising solu-
tion to one of our nation’s greatest healthcare cost concerns. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare spending in America is growing at an alarming rate. 
In 2015 healthcare spending totaled $3.2 trillion, or $9990 per 
person.1 This spending is projected to grow at an average of 5.8% 
between 2015 and 2025—approximately 1.3% faster than the GDP.2 
With healthcare costs rising every year, controlling this growth has 
 
 1. National Health Expenditures 2016 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports 
/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2017). 
 2. Sean P. Keehan et al., National Expenditure Projections, 2015–2025: Economy, Prices, 
and Aging Expected to Shape Spending and Enrollment, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1522, 1522–31 (2016). 
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become a national priority.3 One area with noticeably rising costs is 
the pharmaceutical industry. Americans spent $323 billion (rough-
ly 10% of total healthcare expenditures) on prescription medica-
tions in 2016—and that is after rebates and discounts.4 For those 
under age sixty-five, drug prices are expected to jump 11.6% in 
2017.5 As a comparison, wages are expected to rise only 2.5% in 
2017.6 Perhaps unsurprisingly, when comparing industries’ net 
profits and percent growth, biotech companies consistently rank 
higher than almost any other industry.7 It is these sky-high cor-
porate profits that account for a remarkable portion of rising 
medication prices.8 While some individuals have recently proposed 
ways to rein in drug prices—such as foreign importation—more 
overarching reform is needed.9 To counter the pharmaceutical in-
dustry’s abnormal market forces and to control unsustainable costs, 
Congress should enact a pharmaceutical Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) 
 
 3. Zeke Emanuel et al., State Options to Control Health Care Costs and Improve Quality, 
HEALTH AFF. (Apr. 28, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/04/28/state-options-to 
-control-health-care-costs-and-improve-quality/; Steven M. Lieberman & Paul B. Ginsburg, 
Would Price Transparency for Generic Drugs Lower Costs for Payers and Patients?, BROOKINGS 
INST.  (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/es_20170613_ge 
nericdrugpricing.pdf (outlining that every one percent in an average generic prescription 
reimbursement would cut $1 billion from the nation’s healthcare spending). 
 4. U.S. Prescription Drug Spending as High as $610 Billion by 2021: Report, CNBC: 
HEALTH CARE (May 4, 2017, 6:12 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/04/us-prescription 
-drug-spending-as-high-as-610-billion-by-2021-report.html (“U.S. spending on prescription 
medicines in 2016 increased by 5.8 percent over 2015 levels to $450 billion based on list prices, 
and by 4.8 percent to $323 billion when adjusted for discounts and rebates.”). 
 5. For older Americans, price hikes will be a little lower at 9.9%. Aimee Picchi, 
Prognosis for Rx in 2017: More Painful Drug-Price Hikes, CBS NEWS: MONEYWATCH (Dec. 30, 
2016, 12:32 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/drug-prices-to-rise-12-percent-in-2017/. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Keith Speights, 12 Big Pharma Stats That Will Blow You Away, MOTLEY FOOL (July 
31, 2016, 2:04 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/07/31/12-big-pharma-stats 
-that-will-blow-you-away.aspx; see also Sean Williams, 7 Facts You Probably Don’t Know About 
Big Pharma, MOTLEY FOOL (July 19, 2015, 9:06 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing 
/value/2015/07/19/7-facts-you-probably-dont-know-about-big-pharma.aspx (explaining 
the finances of pharmaceutical companies). 
 8. Melody Petersen, How 4 Drug Companies Rapidly Raised Prices on Life-Saving Drugs, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016, 3:35 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-senate-drug 
-price-study-20161221-story.html (“The companies raised prices—not to fund research to 
discover new drugs—but to boost profits for executives and investors.”). 
 9. Rachel Bluth, Should the U.S. Make It Easier to Import Prescription Drugs?, PBS (Mar. 
22, 2017, 10:33 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/u-s-make-easier-import-pre 
scription-drugs. 
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regulation, similar to that imposed by the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) for health insurance companies. 
A. MLR Regulation Corrects Market Failure in the Insurance Industry 
Imposing an MLR regulation would assist in managing the 
market failures in the pharmaceutical industry, as it has for the 
health insurance industry. Market failure occurs when, for a variety 
of reasons, a market fails to function like a normal free market by 
not allocating resources efficiently or achieving price equilibrium.10 
One type of market failure is inequality, in which transactions 
concentrate rewards in the hands of a few.11 In the health insurance 
industry, inequality is exemplified when the free market economy 
fails to provide reasonable safeguards to prevent insurers from 
raising premiums—well beyond what a consumer would willingly 
spend—simply in order to concentrate wealth for the insurance 
executives.12 Given the non-transparent and third-party payor 
natures of health insurance, normal market forces are often 
inadequate to achieve price equilibrium in this industry. The 
ACA’s insurance MLR regulation attempts to normalize resource 
allocation in this market by putting guidelines around how much 
revenue may be kept as profit or used for other administra-
tive expenses.13  
In general, an MLR distinguishes the dollars spent on “other” 
expenses, such as administrative expenses and profits, from 
“medical loss.”14 “Medical loss” is defined as care-related and 
improvement expenditures like treatment, providers’ salaries, and 
 
 10. Types of Market Failure, ECON. ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk 
/Market_failures/Types_of_market_failure.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Wendell Potter, Why Big Insurance Adores the American Health Care Act, MOYERS 
& CO. (Mar. 23, 2017), http://billmoyers.com/story/why-big-insurance-adores-the-am 
erican-health-care-act/; see also Fighting Unreasonable Health Insurance Premium Increases, CTR. 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets 
-and-FAQs/ratereview05192011a.html (last updated Nov. 16, 2011) (laying out the unex-
plained rapidly rising health insurance premiums and other health insurance trends pre-
ACA that supported the need for the insurance MLR regulation). 
 13. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 158 (2017). 
 14. Medical Loss Ratio, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/med 
ical-loss-ratio-MLR/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2017). 
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research and development (R&D) costs.15 “Other” expenses include 
those providing relatively less value directly to the consumer, such 
as overhead, marketing, C-suite salaries, and profits.16 The ACA’s 
MLR regulation requires health insurance companies that keep 
more than 15% of their income from large employer plans for these 
“other” expenses (or 20% from small employer and individual 
plans) to rebate the excess back to the consumer.17 The regulation 
establishes an 85:15 or 80:20 ratio: Insurers must spend 85% or 80% 
of their revenues directly on “medical loss.” In doing so, the MLR 
regulation ensures that health insurers provide a reasonable 
amount of value to the consumer, in effect moderating their 
premium hikes.18 Consequently, the MLR regulation incentivizes 
insurers to invest in value-promoting care and improvements, 
while refining efficiencies in less value-adding areas—particularly 
by reducing administrative waste and outlandish profits. In an 
industry where normal free market forces are inadequate, the 
ACA’s MLR regulation has successfully pared down insurers’ 
“other” costs, including profits.19 
B. MLR Regulation Returns Billions to Consumers 
Since the enactment of the health insurance MLR regulation, 
health insurance companies have returned billions of dollars that 
were previously kept for profits and other administrative costs in 
 
 15. Medical Loss Ratio, supra note 14; Louise Norris, Billions in ACA Rebates Show 80/20 
Rule’s Impact, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.healthinsurance.org 
/affordable-care-act/medical-loss-ratio-returns-nearly-2b-to-consumers/; Rate Review & the 
80/20 Rule, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/health-care-law-protections/rate 
-review/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2017). 
 16. Medical Loss Ratio, supra note 14. 
 17. Id.; Norris, supra note 15; Rate Review & the 80/20 Rule, supra note 15. By law, 
insurance companies cannot base the price of health premiums on health, medical history, 
or gender. They can only account for five things when setting premium prices: age, location, 
tobacco use, individual versus family enrollment, or plan category. How Insurance Companies 
Set Health Premiums, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/how-plans-set-your 
-premiums/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2017). 
 18. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-580, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: 
EARLY EFFECTS OF MEDICAL LOSS RATIO REQUIREMENTS AND REBATES ON INSURERS AND 
ENROLLEES 1 (2014) [hereinafter PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE]. 
 19. See Norris, supra note 15. 
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the form of rebates for employers and consumers.20 For example, 
seventy-five percent of the money returned was originally used to 
pay brokers and agents, but since brokers’ and agents’ pay fell on 
the “other” side of the MLR ratio, insurers had to rebate the excess 
funds so as to meet the ratio threshold.21 Insurers are further adjust-
ing payments to agents and brokers, some reporting the MLR 
regulation thresholds as the primary motivator.22 Most remarkably, 
insurers’ underwriting gain (i.e., profits) diminished markedly 
from $8.8 to $3.7 billion, from 2012 to 2014.23 Specifically, insurers 
returned $1.1 billion in rebates to consumers in 2012, $504 million 
in 2013, down to $333 million in 2014, up to $469 million in 2015, 
and $397 million in 2016.24 The ACA’s MLR regulation did its job. 
Insurers are right-sizing their premiums and rebating billions of 
dollars back to employers and individuals.25 While tightening their 
belts and squeezing out less value-adding costs, these companies 
still recoup healthy profits. 
Importantly, the MLR ratio is not arbitrary or impractical. Be-
fore the ACA’s MLR regulation was enacted, most insurers (77% of 
insurers in the large employer market and 70% in the small market) 
 
 20. Specifically, insurers returned $1.1 billion in rebates in 2012, $504 million for 2013, 
down to $333 million in 2014, up to $469 million in 2015, and $397 million in 2016. Norris, 
supra note 15. 
 21. PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 18, at 18. 
 22. Furthermore, administrative costs for the 2014 individual market decreased de-
spite an increase in premium revenue. This indicates insurers are expanding coverage to 
more individuals while maintaining efficient administrative expenses. See id. at 21; see also 
Mark A. Hall & Michael J. McCue, Realizing Health Reform’s Potential: How Has the Affordable 
Care Act Affected Health Insurers’ Financial Performance?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 2016), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2016/jul 
/1886_hall_insurers_financial_performance_aca_rb_revised_07_26_2016.pdf. 
 23. Hall, supra note 22, at 4–5. To note, in 2017 insurers reported markedly increased 
underwriting gain and net income all while remaining within the ratio requirements. This 
merits further investigation, including into the effects of the recent repeal of the health 
insurer tax. Perhaps the influx of subsidy money means the resulting ratio of “other” should 
be smaller. See Bob Herman, Blue Cross Blue Shield Insurers Are Still Doing Well, AXIOS (Nov. 
7, 2017), https://www.axios.com/the-blue-cross-blue-shield-insurers-are-still-doing-well-
2507217868.html. One possible explanation is diversification of portfolios. For example, 
UnitedHealth Group has cut back their participation in the “money-losing” individual 
market from thirty-four states to three and diversified into various other profitable areas, 
such as data management, outpatient clinics, and surgical services. Jeff Sommer, Gripes About 
Obamacare Aside, Health Insurers Are in a Profit Spiral, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/business/health-insurers-profit.html. 
 24. Norris, supra note 15. 
 25. Id. 
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already met these standards.26 Furthermore, the legislation permits 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services “to adjust the MLR 
standard for the individual market in a State if requiring issuers to 
meet that standard may destabilize the individual market.”27 The 
ratio’s purpose is not to impinge on financial viability; instead, it is 
to provide a check on insurer’s expenses when the free market 
alone has failed to do so. Ultimately, the MLR regulation acts as a 
value guardrail. While market instability and an influx of costs 
have pushed health insurance premiums upward, the MLR regu-
lation has provided a much-needed check on profits and other 
expenses to ensure a certain level of consumer value. Otherwise, this 
value would be sacrificed for profits and shareholder dividends in 
this abnormal market. 
C. Extend the MLR Regulation to the Pharmaceutical Industry 
This Note proposes applying a similar MLR regulation to the 
pharmaceutical industry, another industry characterized by market 
failure. Similar to its effect on the health insurance industry, this 
ratio regulation would provide a much-needed check on excessive 
profits in the pharmaceutical industry. It would also ensure a cer-
tain level of value for consumers. Instead of impinging on financial 
viability, it would simply erect guardrails to stabilize this abnormal 
pharmaceutical market. Doing so could also incentivize drug com-
panies to right-size their drug prices. Although the MLR ratio 
varies considerably by company, the ratio for the pharmaceutical 
industry, and specifically for Big Pharma, currently hovers some-
where around 30% “medical loss” and 70% “other” expenses.28 
Specifically, the pharmaceutical industry on average spends 70% of 
revenue on its “other” expenses: 23% of its revenues on marketing, 
30% on manufacturing, and 21% on profits.29 The “medical loss” 
 
 26. Still, less than half of the individual market insurers (43%) met the standard. 
Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 29, 2012), 
http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/explaining-health-care-reform-medical-loss-ratio-mlr/. 
 27. 45 C.F.R. § 158.101 (2017). 
 28. See infra notes 29 and 30. 
 29. In 2013, the profit margin for pharmaceutical companies ranged from 10% to 42%, 
with an average of 18%. Pfizer was at the top of the profit list, and four other companies 
(Hoffman-La Roche, AbbVie, GlaxoSmithKline, and Eli Lilly) had profit margins of more 
than 20%. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC NEWS 
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makes up about 30%, including 17% on R&D.30 Due to differences 
between the two industries, this proposal acknowledges that the in-
surance industry’s 80:20 ratio may not be practical here.31 There-
fore, this proposal recommends a ratio of 40:60 for the pharmaceu-
tical industry and, if necessary, a profit cap around 12% (down 
from the current 21%).32  
Part II discusses how the healthcare market’s abnormal nature 
results in market failure in the pharmaceutical market. Part III 
enumerates the resultant disproportionate profit garnering in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Part IV proposes the application of an 
MLR regulation to the pharmaceutical industry to right this market, 
laying out ratio details, the incentives that result from assigning 
various expense categories to different sides of the ratio, and other 
related reasoning. Furthermore, it argues that applying the MLR 
regulation to the pharmaceutical industry provides a promising, 
 
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223. “[Twenty-one percent] is 
the 2015 profit margin that Forbes estimated for the healthcare technology industry, making 
it by far the most profitable industry of all, with major and generic pharmaceutical 
companies leading the way. The company really setting the pace is Gilead Sciences 
(NASDAQ:GILD), which has a profit margin of nearly 53% over the last 12 months.” 
Speights, supra note 7. As a point of reference, the profit margin of pharmaceutical companies 
was essentially the same as that of banks (19%), but the banks’ range of profit was lower, 
from 5% to 29%. SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42735, MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIO REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA): 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2014); Prabir Basu et al., Analysis of Manufacturing Costs in Pharma-
ceutical Companies, 3 J. OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 30, 30 (2008) (“In the pharma-
ceutical industry, costs attributed to manufacturing are a major part of a company’s total 
expenses.”), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225466494_Analysis_of 
_Manufacturing_Costs_in_Pharmaceutical_Companies (accessed Mar. 13, 2018). “Manufac-
turing costs are a substantial part of their total cost structure. According to some estimates, 
these costs can be as high as 27–30% of sales for manufacturers of brand-name pharma-
ceuticals, more than double the share of costs for research and Development.” Id.; Catherine 
D. Deangelis, Big Pharma Profits and the Public Loses, 94 MILBANK Q. 30, 30–33 (2016); ROCHE 
GROUP, FINANCE REPORT 2015, at 4 (2016), http://www.roche.com/dam/jcr:74af99eb-b51a 
-4f13-88b2-aacaf9f53c0c/en/fb15e.pdf (Pfizer, Hoffmann-La Roche, AbbVie, GlaxoSmith-
Kline, and Eli Lilly). 
 30. See also Ben Adams, The Top 10 Pharma R&D Budgets in 2016, FIERCEBIOTECH (Apr. 
26, 2017), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/special-report/top-10-pharma-r-d-budgets-2016 
(“On average last year, the top 10 Big Pharmas spent just over 17% of their top line on 
research, with GlaxoSmithKline spending the second least in percentage terms at 12.9%, and 
the least in absolute numbers at £3.62 billion ($4.49 billion).”). 
 31. See supra note 15. 
 32. See Deangelis, supra note 29, at 30; Anderson, supra note 32. 
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collaborative solution to one of the nation’s most pressing health-
care cost conundrums. Part V concludes. 
II. ABNORMAL MARKET FORCES IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY 
RESULT IN MARKET FAILURE 
Normal market forces usually curb a good’s price to a market 
equilibrium—a price amenable to both buyer and seller.33 
However, the unique arrangements in the American healthcare 
industry effectuate a market that lacks these steadying forces.34 
Normal market forces include buyers who are reasonably well 
informed, make purchases independent of third-party payors (e.g., 
insurance companies), and have multiple choices among sup-
pliers.35 These and other forces combine with basic supply and 
demand principles to create price equilibrium.36 Admittedly, there 
are areas in healthcare that could be categorized as “normal” 
markets where healthcare is clearly a “product” for sale, such as 
elective eye surgeries, Fitbits, and over-the-counter Tylenol. But the 
market for prescription medication is anything but normal. In large 
part, this is due to the fact that it lacks many of these normal 
factors—quality and price transparency, independent buyers using 
their own money, and multiple options of goods from which to 
choose.37 Without the normal “free market” forces, the laws of 
 
 33. Robert J. Graham, How to Determine Price: Find Economic Equilibrium Between 
Supply and Demand, DUMMIES, http://www.dummies.com/education/economics/how-to 
-determine-price-find-economic-equilibrium-between-supply-and-demand (last visited Jan. 
24, 2018); Fiona M. Scott Morton, The Problems of Price Controls, 24 REGULATION 50, 50 (2001) 
(“The determining of market prices through the dynamic interaction of supply and demand 
is the basic building block of economics. . . . This dynamic interaction produces an equi-
librium market price; when buyers and sellers transact freely, the price that results causes 
the quantity demanded by consumers to exactly equal the supply produced by sellers.”). 
 34. See Chris Ladd, There Is Never a ‘Free Market’ in Health Care, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2017, 
10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisladd/2017/03/07/there-is-never-a-free-mar 
ket-in-health-care/#2427c6b71147. 
 35. Alain C. Enthoven, Market Forces and Efficient Health Care Systems, 23 HEALTH AFF. 
25, 25 (2004). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Shelby Livingston, Is the Price Right? Solving Healthcare’s Transparency Problem, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE, http://www.modernhealthcare.com/reports/achieving-transparency 
-in-healthcare/#!/ (“[T]he industry undoubtedly remains one of the nation’s most opaque. 
The scarcity of price and quality information is often blamed for the high cost of care.”) (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
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supply and demand do not balance each other in a way that leads 
to affordable pricing. 
A. Lack of Transparency in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Contributes to Market Failure 
In a normal market, consumers are well informed about their 
needs and choices.38 For example, individuals know their shoe size 
and preferred shoe styles, and they can research the prices and 
quality of various shoes online or in stores.39 This information 
empowers them to decide which shoes meet their needs, weigh the 
price and quality options, and make reasoned decisions regarding 
which shoes to buy. However, in the pharmaceutical industry 
similar transparency is much more difficult due to information and 
control asymmetries between patient and provider, a lack of 
transparent pricing, and healthcare’s highly inelastic market. 
1. Information and control asymmetries between physicians and patients 
hamper consumer power 
Prescription drug consumers consistently lack information that 
is normally available to consumers in other markets. This partly 
stems from power and information asymmetries between pre-
scribers and their patients.40 Unlike shoe purchasers, ordinary 
prescription drug consumers do not have the necessary training to 
identify their health needs or the remedying medications.41 Rather, 
 
 38. See Enthoven, supra note 35, at 25. 
 39. Perfect Competition, ECONOMICS ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Busi 
ness_economics/Perfect_competition.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2018); see also Consumer Pro-
tection, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/law 
/law/consumer-product-safety-act (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (discussing what information 
consumers should reasonably be able to expect). 
 40. “The information asymmetry experienced by consumers, providers, and payers 
shield these critical stakeholders from the information they need to make decisions about 
what works best for them.” INST. OF MEDICINE, THE HEALTHCARE IMPERATIVE: LOWERING 
COSTS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES 335 (Pierre L. Yong, Robert S. Saunders & LeighAnne 
Olson eds., 2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK53921/. “As a rule the doctor 
has relevant information that the patient lacks.” Stephen Shmanske, Information Asymmetries 
in Health Services: The Market Can Cope, 1 INDEP. REV. 191, 197 (1996). 
41. Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry, 
14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2007). 
Even more difficult for most consumers is knowing and evaluating the 
expected long-term effects of the drug, the possible complications, or the reactions 
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drug consumers are usually unaware of either the existence of or 
the differences between prescription drugs like Prilosec and 
Protonix, or Perjeta and Pegintron. And drugs are arguably more 
complex than shoes and other commodities and require a certain 
level of training to know which is appropriate for which medical 
need. In fact, the reasons patients even go to doctors in the first 
place include their extensive medical expertise and prescription 
pads, both of which patients lack.42 They turn to the experts whose 
years of training enable them to identify health needs, weigh 
options, and then sign that pad—because without a prescriber’s 
signature, patients cannot obtain prescription medication, even if 
the information about the medical need or the prescribed medi-
cation were more transparent.43 The same is not true for shoes or 
houses. Not even car or computer repairs require a graduate-level 
licensed provider. In fact, with only a little training, consumers can 
buy and change their own engine oil or tires. But with prescription 
drugs the capacity to understand sufficiently the medical nuances 
and to consider the choices, as well as the power to access the 
prescription medication, lies with prescribers.44 Sometimes only the 
 
with other substances. Moreover, even if they were affluent enough to do so, 
because combining different drugs may be ineffective, or even lethal, consumers 
cannot simply try every drug and every cure until they find the one that works. 
They need to know before they commit to a specific drug that it is likely to work.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 42. See Shmanske, supra note 40, at 191 (“[O]ne type of asymmetric information occurs 
because the doctor typically has knowledge the patient does not—that’s why the patient sees 
the doctor in the first place.”). 
 43. “A drug intended for human use . . . shall be dispensed only (i) upon a written 
prescription of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug . . . .” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 353(b)(1)(B) (2012) (“The act of dispensing a drug contrary to the provisions of this paragraph 
shall be deemed to be an act which results in the drug being misbranded while held for sale.”). 
 44. Katz supra, note 41.  
Perhaps more importantly, however dramatic the effect of a drug on one 
person may be, since the effect of drugs may vary from person to person, 
meaningful information on drugs’ quality can be obtained only by looking at large 
samples and carefully applying statistical methods. Not only is this type of 
epidemiological research beyond the reach of consumers, it is also beyond the 
reach of most practicing physicians. Therefore, if sellers (drug companies) have 
better information about the efficacy and safety of their products, severe 
asymmetry of information about the quality of drugs (their efficacy and safety) 
may occur.  
Id. at 14 (internal citations omitted). 
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drug companies themselves have the information.45 Overall, the 
information and power imbalances in the prescription drug indus-
try place incredible power into the hands of healthcare providers, 
beyond the reach of the average drug consumer.46 As such, the 
consumer loses much of the ability to directly choose cheaper 
products and thus coax prices down to reasonable levels. Further-
more, the cost of meeting with a provider for the prescription 
further adds to the rising cost of drug distribution and other 
healthcare costs. 
Some argue that these asymmetries are inconsequential since 
other markets with both information and power asymmetries, such 
as car repairs and housing markets, have coped and achieved some 
level of market equilibrium.47 However, both cars and houses are 
some of our most expensive commodities, in part due to the poten-
tial for danger and resultant care we take to ensure our safety. 
Furthermore, the potential inconvenience or additional cost re-
sulting from a mistake in car repairs or a housing purchase is very 
different than the potential bodily harm or even death resulting 
from misguided medication prescription. Certainly, harm done to 
a car or house can be costly. But it is much less personal.  
Moreover, with individual differences in symptoms and ana-
tomy, it is even harder for prescribers to know at the outset of a 
 
 45. The pharmaceutical companies have done the extensive chemical and epide-
miological research on their products and are then responsible to disseminate that 
information out to prescribers. Id. “Therefore, if sellers (drug companies) have better 
information about the efficacy and safety of their products, severe asymmetry of information 
about the quality of drugs (their efficacy and safety) may occur.” Id. at 14 n.65. 
 46. Charles Ornstein, Ryann Grochowski Jones & Mike Tigas, Drug-Company Payments 
Mirror Doctors’ Brand-Name Prescribing, NPR (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr 
.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/17/470679452/drug-company-payments-mirror-doc 
tors-brand-name-prescribing (“A ProPublica analysis has found that doctors who receive 
payments from the medical industry do indeed prescribe drugs differently on average than 
their colleagues who don’t.”); Shmanske, supra note 40, at 198 (“[P]atients still have no 
guarantee that competent, licensed doctors will not use their informational advantage for 
personal gain.”). 
 47. See Shmanske, supra note 40, at 197. 
  The information asymmetry in the doctor-patient relationship is simply 
another case of scarcity with which the market can cope. . . . Getting a second 
opinion in health-care markets is comparable with comparison shopping in other 
markets, yet no one claims that markets fail because prudent buyers of clothing 
expend time, effort, and resources shopping or because would-be homebuyers 
order termite inspections. 
Id. 
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medical encounter which medication is appropriate and how much 
of it to prescribe.48 When someone walks into a hospital, the 
provider cannot run a manufacturer-guided diagnostic or look up 
the make and model to find the appropriate repair part like a car 
mechanic can when changing engine oil or spark plugs. Finding the 
right antibiotic, chemotherapy treatment, or more notably, the right 
psychiatric medication, often requires time and periods of trial and 
error, even for extensively trained physicians. This uncertainty 
characterizes the healthcare market more so than other markets.49 
This is why it is called a medical “practice.” Putting these decisions 
into the hands of untrained buyers is almost unconscionable—
similar to handing car keys to a six-year-old. Consenting to the 
information asymmetry is essentially an imperative to engage in 
this market. Yet, at the same time, this asymmetry weakens buyer 
power, and thus the forces to lower prices are insufficient to achieve 
true price equilibrium. 
2. Transparent drug pricing is often impractical, and the resultant lack 
of price information further limits buyer power 
Buyer power is also limited due to costs that are often opaque—
even less transparent than the need for or the fit of a specific 
medication.50 Unlike shoes, prescription drugs are not price tagged, 
nor do hospitals list drug prices on a sign above the welcome desk 
like oil changes at a car repair shop.51 Prescribers don’t hand over a 
priced menu during their hospital rounds when they ask, “Do you 
prefer Zofran or Phenergan? Percocet or Norco?” In fact, doctors, 
on average, discuss drug costs with only 2.6 out of 10 patients.52 At 
 
 48. Anna D. Sinaiko & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Increased Price Transparency in Health 
Care—Challenges and Potential Effects, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 891, 891–93 (2011). 
 49. See Paul K.J. Han, William M.P. Klein & Neeraj K. Arora, Varieties of Uncertainty in 
Health Care: A Conceptual Taxonomy, 31 MED. DECISION MAKING 828, 828–38 (2011). 
 50. Livingston, supra note 37 (“[T]he industry undoubtedly remains one of the nation’s 
most opaque. The scarcity of price and quality information is often blamed for the high cost 
of care.”) (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
 51. Cf. Featured Auto Services, WALMART, https://www.walmart.com/cp/auto-ser 
vices/1087266 (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
 52. Doctors and Rx Prices: Ending the Silence, CONSUMER REP. (June 21, 2016), https:// 
www.consumerreports.org/drugs/doctors-and-rx-prices-ending-the-silence/ (“[Six] percent 
of people currently taking a prescription drug found out about the cost of their new medi-
cation during a doctor’s visit, when the prescription was being written.”). 
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times, this is because even the physicians are unaware of drug costs, 
further limiting patients’ access to price information.53 Once the 
medication is prescribed, nurses administering the ordered medi-
cation to the patients usually do not discuss the cost.54 Not only are 
they similarly unaware of the price, but some would even consider 
that type of discussion unethical.55 
Drug prices are complicated. While consumers are usually 
aware of their drug copay, the ultimate drug price is often obscured 
by insurance rebates or discounts mandated to government payors 
(e.g., Medicaid).56 This leads to elevated, ever-fluctuating list prices 
that determine the consumers’ portion to be paid.57 Complex “drug 
formularies” from the insurance companies further complicate 
drug prices because consumers will pay vastly different amounts 
depending on the drug status (e.g., cheaper “preferred drugs” or 
generics, or expensive specialty and brand drugs).58 Even calling to 
get a price estimate can be a fruitless endeavor. “It depends on your 
insurance,” is a far-too-common response. Overall, drug prices are 
 
 53. See Livingston, supra note 37 (“[C]linicians often don’t know the price tag of the 
medical services they provide.”). 
 54. See Lieberman & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1 (“The U.S. system for selling 
prescription medicines involves multiple parties, differs markedly for generic and brand 
drugs, has complex, nontransparent financial arrangements, and limits available information 
in assymetric ways that disadvantage third-party payers and patients.”). 
 55. In my experience, nurses make efforts to save patients money in simple ways. But 
when a patient is seriously ill the priority becomes the patient’s care and comfort. Price dis-
cussions become superfluous and insensitive. 
 56. “[T]he complex charges for prescription drugs often range from co-payments of 
$15–$100 for ’preferred‘ drugs to 45% or more of the cost of specialty or non-preferred 
drugs.” Grace-Marie Turner, Price Transparency Is Critical to Drug Pricing Solutions, FORBES 
(July 11, 2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gracemarieturner/2017/07/11/price 
-transparency-is-critical-to-drug-pricing-solutions/#1193fda5204a. “A huge system of drug 
rebates and discounts happens behind the scenes in the pharmaceutical supply chain, further 
distorting the market and confusing consumers about the actual price of a drug. Only a 
trickle of these discounts and rebates actually reaches the consumer.” Id. 
 57. “Even though rebates paid by biopharmaceutical companies can substantially 
reduce the prices insurers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) pay for brand medicines, 
insurers use list prices—rather than discounted prices—to determine how much to charge 
patients when they pay their share, further increasing what consumers pay.” Id. 
 58. Insurance companies generally create complex “drug formularies” in which 
their insured patients pay less for “preferred” drugs, especially generics, but can pay much 
more for expensive brand and specialty drugs. Laurie Toich, Drug Rebates: Do Patients Really 
Benefit?, AM. J. PHARMACY BENEFITS (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.ajpb.com/news/drug 
-rebates-do-patients-really-benefit; see also Turner, supra note 56. 
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much less transparent than the prices of other products.59 Many 
suppliers refuse even to disclose how they set prices.60 And even 
when price transparency is not an issue, there is little patients can 
do to shop around for the best price if they are locked in to an 
insurance plan with a set drug copay. A copay that is always a set 
amount irrespective of the drug prescribed further removes the 
consumer from the cost information and reduces buyer power. 
Furthermore, the urgent nature of healthcare itself differen-
tiates it from other industries. Few persons would stop emergency 
medical services in an ambulance or in the intensive care unit to 
price-compare drugs or obtain approval from the consumer. Nor 
does it do much good to explain to a patient undergoing surgery 
the price of all the medicines the hospital has contracted to use for 
anesthesia and preventive antibiotics. It is also unreasonable to 
explain to sick, hospitalized patients (or their families) all of the 
drugs that are being used in the patient’s care. These examples 
demonstrate that pushing for drug price transparency to reduce the 
cost of these particularly expensive areas in healthcare is impracti-
cal. Since consumers’ access to this information—and thus their 
ability to compare quality and price—is severely limited, or even at 
times impossible, buyer power rests mainly outside their control. 
Instead, the buyer power lies dominantly in the hands of providers 
and insurers.61 
Admittedly, prescribers and patients have some increasing 
access to the price of medications, as well as increased incentive to 
pay attention.62 A price comparison may be accessible to patients 
 
 59. See Livingston, supra note 37 (“For the most part, consumers remain in the dark 
about what they will be asked to pay after visiting a primary-care doctor or undergoing an 
inpatient procedure. In that way, healthcare is unlike every other aspect of the consumer 
experience in America. It would be unimaginable to leave a broken-down car with a mechan-
ic before getting a cost estimate, for example. But in healthcare, ‘everyone’s flying blind.’”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, More Transparency Proposed for Prescription Drug Price 
Increases Under Bill Passed by California Senate, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2017, 4:33 PM), http:// 
www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-more-sunlight-pro 
posed-for-prescription-1496186778-htmlstory.html (“Alarmed by skyrocketing prices for 
some prescription drugs, the California Senate on Tuesday approved a measure aimed at 
increasing pressure to hold down costs to consumers by requiring more public reporting of 
price hikes.”); see also Livingston, supra note 37 (“[M]any other healthcare organizations, 
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via a call to a local pharmacy or by visiting certain websites.63 The 
majority of health plans (self-insured employers in particular) offer 
cost-estimating tools for healthcare prices.64 And some insurance 
companies list drug prices per drug tier.65 Yet sources indicate few 
patients (three percent) actually compare costs of care among pro-
viders—often because they are unaware of the above-mentioned 
tools.66 And frequently drug copays are set by the insurer or de-
pend on the pharmacy, so price comparison at the time of prescrib-
ing would be practically useless.  
3. Healthcare is a highly inelastic market 
Most importantly, unlike a physical body, commodities like 
shoes and cars can be replaced. In commodities markets, the repair, 
maintenance, or inspection costs are all controlled by normal mar-
ket forces, regardless of the information and power imbalances 
inherent in the service. When shoes wear out, the consumer throws 
them away and buys a new pair at a normal market rate. If the 
repair costs for a damaged car outweigh replacement costs, the car 
is “totaled.” The consumer compares the price and quality of new 
models and uses what equity is left on the “totaled” car to purchase 
a new one—again at a normal market rate. 
Healthcare offers consumers no such alternatives. There is no 
market-controlled replacement model available if cancer metasta-
sizes throughout a body or when heart-failure-induced fluid build-
up makes it difficult to breathe. Grandma isn’t “totaled” when her 
urinary tract infections become resistant to normal antibiotics, nor 
is mom when her cancer pain becomes unbearable. It is hard to cut 
off funds for chronic pain or a failing body because, unlike a car, 
 
from providers to insurers, are working to increase price transparency for the services they 
provide, to varying degrees of success.”). 
 63. See, e.g., PHARMACYCHECKER.COM, https://www.pharmacychecker.com (last vi-
sited Jan. 19, 2017); SCRIPTSAVE WELLRX, https://www.wellrx.com/prescriptions (last visit-
ed Jan. 19, 2017). 
 64. See Livingston, supra note 37 (“Nearly all major health plans offer a cost-estimator 
tool or contract with a third-party vendor to provide one so that commercially insured 
patients can search for a common clinical service and obtain a cost estimate.”). 
 65. How Do Drug Tiers Work?, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD BLUE CARE NETWORK OF 
MICHIGAN, http://www.bcbsm.com/medicare/help/understanding-plans/pharmacy-pre 
scription-drugs/tiers.html (last updated Oct. 2, 2017). 
 66. See Livingston, supra note 37. 
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mom is irreplaceable. There is no “going market rate” for the price 
of a loved one. Consumers cannot refuse to participate in this 
market, so the medical bills pile up. In other words, this market is 
highly inelastic; no matter how high prices rise, the demand for life-
saving drugs stays constant. As such, the costs of life-saving or 
quality-of-life-enhancing prescription drugs from profit-maximiz-
ing companies know few market bounds. To illustrate, the biggest 
cash cow for the pharmaceutical industry is oncology (worth 
$78.9 billion).67 Pharmacyclics’ cancer drug Ibrutinib alone raked in 
revenue over 67 times the R&D investment.68 Clearly, consumers’ 
usual qualms over paying astronomical prices were absent for this 
product. Either they didn’t care what it cost, or they didn’t know—
probably both. In general, when cancer, or any other debilitating 
mental or physical illness, rears its ugly head buyers have priorities 
other than deal-shopping. In a way, it is a collective sense of hu-
manity—an unwillingness to begrudge the funds needed in order 
to save a life or prolong suffering—that throws normal market 
forces out the window. The normal market is not designed for life-
or-death situations. Drugs are. 
Combined together, the information imbalance between patient 
and prescriber, opaque pricing information, and the strong sense of 
empathy intrinsic to human nature all render the prescription drug 
market uniquely inelastic. Consequently, with so much power out-
side consumer control, this market’s asymmetries of information 
and control cripple the patient-buyer’s typical ability to compare 
options, match them to their needs, and pick those options that are 
simultaneously effective and affordable.69 
 
 67. Bryan Mc Govern, Why Consider Investing in Pharmaceutical Stocks?, INVESTING 
NEWS (Jan. 1, 2018), https://investingnews.com/daily/life-science-investing/pharmaceut 
ical-investing/investing-in-pharmaceutical-stocks/ (“The 2015 report from Statista also 
reveals some of the biggest cash cows for the sector, with oncology pharma taking the lead 
on an indicated value in sales of $78.9 billion.”).  
 68. Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending to Bring a 
Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, 177 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL 
MED. 1569, 1572 (2017). 
 69. Ironically, even if we did have price transparency, it is not guaranteed to lower 
costs. One Harvard Medical School study actually concluded that offering price estimators 
did not necessarily lower costs; it often raised them, as people equated higher cost with 
higher quality. See Livingston, supra note 37 (“[A] 2016 Harvard Medical School study . . . 
found that offering employees a price-estimator tool (in the study’s case, the Truven calcu-
lator) did not lower healthcare spending. In fact, employees who used the tool ended up 
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B. Third-Party Payors Further Frustrate Aspects of a Normal Market 
The third-party payor role of health insurance is unlike other 
types of insurance and further complicates this market. Consumers 
in most commodity markets control their money when they trans-
fer it directly to sellers in exchange for goods.70 For example, when 
one buys groceries or a cell phone, the known amount of cash 
transfers directly to the seller at the time the customer acquires the 
goods. Even when the immediate exchange between buyer and 
seller is obscured by an independent middleman, such as a credit 
card company, the customer is usually aware of and responsible for 
the whole price of the purchased item. Yet the middleman role 
played by health insurers obscures the amount paid and insulates 
the consumer from the loss.  
A middleman is one who facilitates transactions between a 
buyer and seller for a fee, often resulting in price increases.71 
Insurers are a specific type of middleman. Unlike retailers or other 
types of middlemen, insurers collect scheduled payments, or 
premiums, from customers in exchange for a guarantee of some 
compensation in the event of an expensive loss—such as an earth-
quake or hospital visit.72 In the event of such a loss, the customer 
pays a portion as a deductible or out-of-pocket maximum, while 
the insurer pays the rest.73 In essence, insurance transfers risk “from 
an individual to a company,” pooling it with other individuals so 
as to mitigate the losses felt by any one individual.74 Health insurers 
thus use pooled resources to insulate the financial losses of 
 
spending more than those who didn’t. The researchers suggested consumers could spend 
more if they equate high cost with high quality.”). The Livingston article also quotes Alan 
Sager, a Boston University professor of health law, policy, and management, offering his 
opinion: “Asking patients to become informed about price and quality, and make 
decisions about diagnosis and treatment in light of information about price and quality, I 
think that’s largely a waste of time; and worse, it imposes radically unfair burdens on 
many patients.” Id. 
 70. See Consumer Spending, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c 
/consumer-spending.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2018). 
 71. Middleman, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/middleman 
.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
 72. CATHY PARETO, Introduction to Insurance, INVESTOPEDIA (2010), http://elibrary 
.vssdcollege.ac.in/web/data/books-com-sc/bcom-3/Introduction%20To%20insurance.pdf. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Glossary of Insurance Terms, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS, http://www 
.naic.org/consumer_glossary.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
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prescription drug (and other) costs felt by any one consumer. By its 
very design, health insurance is meant to limit a consumer’s 
exposure to healthcare costs. For some types of insurance (e.g., fire 
or earthquake insurance) this design may not pose a substantial 
cost burden. However, because health insurance is used much 
more frequently than other types of insurance, costs escalate with 
corresponding frequency.  
1. The frequent need for health insurance burdens consumers more so 
than other insurance types 
 Health insurance plays a much larger role in a person’s habitual 
finances than other insurance types. For commodities like cars and 
houses, an insurer’s role is largely limited to rarer catastrophic 
situations like a car crash or fire.75 Yet health insurance pays for 
much more than just catastrophes. While brake repairs or oil 
changes are not covered by car insurance, preventive health screen-
ings and other checkups are often covered by health insurance. 
While car insurance does not pay for the gas needed to run the 
engine, health insurance often covers drugs that must be taken on 
a daily basis. While many may not need these daily medications 
when they are young and healthy, few escape the infirmities of old 
age. Additionally, one may have ailing dependents requiring 
significant resources. Eventually, everyone needs health insurance. 
In other words, unlike other insurance types, health insurance is 
constantly necessary to help defray healthcare costs for a significant 
number of people.  
 This unusually large role played by insurers in the pharma-
ceutical industry reduces consumers’ access to information and, 
therefore, their ability to price discriminate between products. 
Specifically, predetermined provider networks frustrate the impact 
that price comparisons and second opinions have on promoting 
competitive pricing the way they do in other markets.76 Usually 
 
 75. Mandated Car Insurance vs. Mandated Health Insurance: What’s the Difference?, 
UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, http://www.uphelp.org/news/mandated-car-insurance-vs-man 
dated-health-insurance-what%E2%80%99s-difference/2012-10-31 (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) 
(“While health insurance covers preventive measures, including checkups and screenings, 
as well as catastrophic events, such as cancer treatments, heart surgery or intensive care, auto 
insurance doesn’t cover preventive measures such as oil changes and brake checks.”). 
 76. Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.health 
care.gov/glossary/preferred-provider-organization-PPO/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
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insurance companies charge the same copay at any pharmacy in 
their preferred network; seeing different providers within the 
network doesn’t change that. And leaving the insurer’s preferred 
network means paying more, which further limits patients’ choices. 
This is vastly different than other types of insurance; for example, 
car insurers don’t stipulate which mechanics to see or at what 
dealer to shop. And changing health insurance companies in order 
to find a cheaper provider usually isn’t an option because health 
insurers are either chosen by an employer or changed once a year 
on the Affordable Care Act’s individual marketplace. Thus, insur-
ers play a more continuous and invasive role in healthcare than in 
other markets—a role that proportionately limits drug consumers’ 
buyer power. 
Over the years, the health insurer’s role has continued to 
expand as the pharmaceutical cost burden has shifted from in-
dividuals to third-party payors. Between 1960 and 1988, direct out-
of-pocket expenditures fell 28%, while public financing increased 
17.6% and private financing increased 10%.77 Even now, third 
parties continue to shield costs. In 2015, 49% of Americans’ health 
insurance was provided through an employer.78 In addition, almost 
85% of those enrolled in the ACA exchanges received healthcare 
subsidies from the government.79 In reality, only about ten cents on 
every healthcare dollar are contributed directly from the patient.80 
The remaining cost is negotiated by insurers and the government.81  
One ironic result of this cost shielding is that the insured end 
up paying more than they otherwise would, since normal pressures 
 
 77. Patricia M. Danzon, Health Care Industry, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONS. 
(1993), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/HealthCareIndustry.html. 
 78. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https:// 
www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=% 
7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) 
(webpage allows the user to examine the health care coverage of the population using a 
variety of filters). 
 79. See Louise Norris, Will You Receive an Obamacare Premium Subsidy?, 
HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.healthinsurance.org/affordable-care-act 
/will-you-receive-an-obamacare-premium-subsidy/. 
 80. John Graham, Opinion, Surprise Medical Bills: A Growing Problem Requiring Price 
Transparency, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2016, 10:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary 
/2016/12/01/surprise-medical-bills-a-growing-problem-requiring-price-transparency/#38 
9daf3b7d27. 
 81. Id. 
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to prevent costs from rising do not exist. In the first two years of the 
ACA’s enactment, out-of-pocket spending plunged 21.4% for the 
poorest Americans.82 Yet, for the average American household, 
premiums rose 12%, which computes to an even larger dollar 
amount.83 Healthcare costs that were avoided by some were 
compensated for by others. In essence, because health consumers 
have historically been shielded from the true cost of healthcare, 
without adequate government or normal market forces to rein in 
expenses, healthcare costs have risen stiflingly high. For many, the 
ACA has started to reverse the cost shielding trend by passing on 
these inflated costs as higher premiums and deductibles. Yet for the 
poorest, the cost shielding trend continues, and when consumers 
are so heavily insulated from the price, price becomes a non-issue—
partly because it can’t be an issue. Insurers and other third parties 
are necessary to aggregate the funds needed to cover elevated drug 
prices and thus mitigate the financial loss felt by consumers. The 
minimum-wage earner and the chronically sick could never afford 
the prices necessary to recoup the millions or billions of dollars 
required for a drug’s development, prescribers’ salaries, or other 
costs.84 Free market advocates insist that eliminating the insurer 
would bring costs down. But again, this is not a normal market. 
Those most in need of the expensive care provided in this market 
(such as nursing homes, intensive care units, and cancer drugs) are 
often the least able to work to pay for it. Consequently, third parties 
must continue to shield consumers from some expensive prescrip-
tion drug costs.   
 
 82. Dan Mangan, Out-Of-Pocket Health Spending Dropped by Nearly 12 Percent—But 
Premiums Rose After Obamacare Rolled Out, CNBC: HEALTH CARE (Jan 22, 2018, 2:31 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/22/out-of-pocket-health-spending-dropped-after-obama 
care-rolled-out.html. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Cost to Develop and Win Marketing Approval for a New Drug is $2.6 Billion, TUFTS CTR. 
FOR STUDY DRUG DEV. (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Article 
/2016/03/14/Tufts-examines-2.87bn-drug-development-cost (“Developing a new prescrip-
tion medicine that gains marketing approval, a process often lasting longer than a decade, is 
estimated to cost $2,558 million . . . .”). 
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2. Third-party payor costs contribute to elevated drug prices 
 Coordination among the various players in the healthcare 
industry carries additional hidden costs.85 The overhead required 
for the negotiating middlemen (e.g., insurance company employees 
and executives, pharmacy benefit managers, pharmacists, drug 
reps) continues to drive up prices.86 One notable example is phar-
macy benefit managers (PBMs), on whom health plans depend for 
negotiating reimbursement terms with retail pharmacies.87  These 
negotiations derive revenues from a combination of fees from the 
drug companies, as well as shared savings from the maintenance of 
pharmacy networks.88 
Ultimately, this unusually significant and disconnected third-
party payor system both isolates consumers from financial loss and 
escalates costs in the pharmaceutical industry—indeed, in the 
whole healthcare system.89 With removed consumers and profit-
maximizing middlemen, drug prices can rise unfettered.90 
 
 85. See Danzon, supra note 77. 
 86. See Jayne O’Donnell, Do Drug Benefit Managers Reduce Health Costs?, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 3, 2014, 2:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2014 
/03/03/pharmacy-benefit-managers-healthcare-costs-savings/5495317/ (“As more people 
become insured under the Affordable Care Act, PBMs will become both more profitable and 
powerful, which could thwart efforts to keep drug costs down, some critics say. Express 
Scripts, for example, is ranked 24th on the Fortune 500, thanks in part to its $29 billion deal 
to buy Medco last year. Last month, the company said it expects to have 10% to 20% growth 
in earnings per share for the next several years, thanks to ‘health care trends, industry 
positioning and the overall environment.’”); Rob Sawicki, How Insurance Companies Drive Up 
the Cost of Life-Saving Drugs for Patients, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2015, 12:37 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rob-sawicki/how-insurance-companies-d_b_8710216.html; 
Turner, supra note 56 (“Caterpillar moved away from its PBM, suspecting that a quarter of 
the manufacturer’s $150 million annual drug bill was being wasted.”). 
 87. See Lieberman & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1 (“Health plans rely heavily on 
contracted pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to negotiate reimbursement terms on their 
behalf with retail pharmacies. However, PBMs also operate mail-order pharmacies, giving 
them knowledge of actual generic drug costs. . . . This disincentive to keep generic drug 
reimbursement low for their health plan client poses an apparent conflict of interest for PBMs 
and increases health plan spending to the extent that a lack of information about actual 
generic drug costs leads to excessive reimbursement.”). 
 88. Pharmacy Benefit Managers, HEALTH AFFAIRS 1, 2 (2017), https://www.healthaffairs 
.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171409.000178/full/healthpolicybrief_178.pdf. 
 89. See Lieberman & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1; see also Danzon, supra note 77. 
 90. See Paul Fronstin & Jack VanDerhei, Savings Medicare Beneficiaries Need for Health 
Expenses: Some Couples Could Need as Much as $350,000, 38 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 1, 7 
(2017), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_Hlth-Svgs.v38no1_31Jan17.pdf; 
see also Norris, supra note 79. 
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C. Monopolistic Features Increase Drug Prices 
Normal markets provide consumers with options.91 A market 
composed of multiple players prevents one seller from elevating a 
product’s prices out of control, since buyers can buy the lower-
priced option.92 Alternatively, a monopolized market lacks the ri-
valry between players that manages price and quality.93 This dearth 
of competition concentrates selling power in the hands of a single 
player.94 That  player then has total control to raise prices.95 In most 
markets, antitrust laws, such as the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
prevent monopolies and promote cost-curbing conditions.96 
However, the American pharmaceutical industry actually facil-
itates monopolies.97 In some cases, medication and treatment op-
tions are limited because science hasn’t advanced and few cures 
exist.98 However, in many cases patents restrict choices by blocking 
innovation of new or improved products.99 As defined by statute, a 
patent is “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering 
for sale, or selling . . . or importing the invention.”100 While patents 
 
 91. See Enthoven, supra note 35, at 25–27. 
 92. Perfect Competition, supra note 39. 
 93.  Monopoly, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monopoly.asp 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
  A monopoly is characterized by the absence of competition, which can lead 
to high costs for consumers, inferior products and services, and corrupt behav-
ior. A company that dominates a business sector or industry can use that 
dominance to its advantage, and at the expense of others. It can create artificial 
scarcities, fix prices, and otherwise circumvent natural laws of supply and 
demand. It can impede new entrants into the field, discriminate, and inhibit 
experimentation or new product development, while the public—robbed of the 
recourse of using a competitor—is at its mercy. A monopolized market often 
becomes an unequal, and even inefficient, one. 
Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice 
/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). 
 97. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of Pre-
scription Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 858, 
859 (2016). 
 98. 8 Diseases for Which We Still Haven’t Found a Cure, EMGN.COM, http://emgn 
.com/entertainment/8-diseases-still-havent-found-cure/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). 
 99. “[T]he current system is not working well . . . the most notable current feature of 
pharmaceutical innovation is the huge ‘drought’ in the development of new products.” 
Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 13 (2013). 
 100.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). 
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help drug makers recoup R&D costs, they also restrict the choices 
available to consumers.101 These market exclusivity rights bypass 
normal market safeguards and create an ideal environment for 
single-product domination.102 As to be expected, this monopoliza-
tion pushes up prices. In fact, the 2013 per capita spending for 
drugs in America was $858—over twice the $400 average of 
nineteen other industrialized nations (many with government-
mandated drug price controls).103 Further exacerbating rising prices 
is the requirement imposed on the majority of U.S. government 
drug payment plans (e.g., Medicare Part D) to cover nearly all drug 
products.104 Under this requirement, drug companies can charge 
whatever they like, and insurers must pay for products if 
prescribed. Admittedly, prior authorizations and other tools do 
serve as a check on prices.105 Yet as a whole, these pharmaceutical 
monopolies are a substantial factor in unrestricted prescription 
drug prices. It is true that patents provide the incentives for drug 
companies to take on the lengthy and risky process of developing 
new drugs. Thus, the solution may not be to get rid of the patent 
system. Instead, there may be a way to alter the market structure as 
a whole to allow for both patents and some restraint on drug prices. 
D. Without Normal Market Forces, Basic Supply and Demand 
Fail to Establish Price Equilibrium 
The tension between supply and demand normally keeps a 
good’s price within a manageable range.106 Yet as explained in 
subsections A through C, this is not a normal market. The demand 
is almost constant for healthcare services, especially for long-term 
conditions, and thus buyer power is significantly weaker than in 
 
 101.  See Kesselheim et al., supra note 97. 
 102.  See id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See id. 
 105. “Prior authorization is a requirement from your insurance company to your 
physician. The physician has to get specific medications (or operations) approved by the 
insurance company before the insurance company will provide full (or any) coverage for 
them.” Prior Authorization for Prescription Drugs: All You Need to Know, HEALTH MARKETS 
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.healthmarkets.com/resources/health-insurance/prior-author 
ization-for-prescription-drugs/. 
 106. Adam Hayes, Economics Basics: Supply and Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www 
.investopedia.com/university/economics/economics3.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). 
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other normal markets. Without the buyer power to counteract the 
massive patent-enhanced seller power, a balanced price equilibri-
um is near impossible.  
1. In general, supply and demand in normal markets result in all-around 
satisfactory prices 
As demand rises, sellers can raise the price of a good without 
fear of alienating buyers.107 For example, if a substantial number 
of buyers desire a Tesla sports car, producers can raise prices and 
still sell plenty of cars.108 But when a good’s price rises higher than 
the buyer’s ability or desire to pay, demand drops.109 For example, 
some demand for the Tesla is lost because of its exorbitant price. On 
the other hand, when demand decreases too low—like for a United 
Airlines flight after a scandal—so does the price.110 In order to 
maximize profits, sellers will attempt to produce and advertise 
more of the higher-priced merchandise (e.g., a Tesla car or the latest 
edition iPhone) over a cheaper model because the return on 
investment is much higher.111 Together, supply and demand bal-
ance each other to reach a price equilibrium—an attractive price for 
both buyers and sellers.112 
 
 107. See Pricing Products, LUMEN LEARNING, https://www.boundless.com/business 
/textbooks/boundless-business-textbook/product-and-pricing-strategies-15/pricing-products 
-96/impacts-of-supply-and-demand-on-pricing-449-1939/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (“If 
demand increases and supply is unchanged, then it leads to a higher equilibrium price and 
higher quantity. If demand decreases and supply is unchanged, then it leads to a lower 
equilibrium price and lower quantity.”). 
 108. See Zachary Shahan, Tesla’s 2016 Deliveries = 76,230+ Vehicles, Production = 83,922 
Vehicles, CLEAN TECHNICA (Jan. 3, 2017), https://cleantechnica.com/2017/01/03/teslas 
-2016-deliveries-production/. 
 109. See Irena Asmundson, Supply and Demand: Why Markets Tick, INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/suppdem.htm (last updated 
July 29, 2017). 
 110. Law of Supply and Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l 
/law-of-supply-demand.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2017); see also Marquita Harris, United Is 
Offering “Apology Fares” That Include Cheap Flights to Europe, REFINERY29 (Apr. 26, 2017, 
6:00 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/2017/04/151846/united-airlines-apology-fares-cheap 
-flights (“Prices have dropped significantly in less than two weeks. Those hefty discounts 
include: ‘round-trip flights to Trinidad and Tobago for as little as $274 (typically $550); flights 
to Paris for $433 (typically $800); and round-trip fares to Mexico City for less than $200 
(typically $500),’ as noted by the site.”). 
 111. See Asmundson, supra note 109 (“The higher the price, the more suppliers are 
likely to produce.”). 
 112. Graham supra, note 33. 
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Yet without normal market forces, the pharmaceutical industry 
cannot establish this price equilibrium. Without the usual access to 
prices or the needed expertise to understand their needs and options, 
uninformed consumers cannot make informed choices between 
products. Nor are they always aware of increasing drug prices, 
especially when third-party payors veil the costs.113 Likewise, when 
a rare, life-changing drug has a monopoly on the market, the 
(inelastic) demand for this drug remains elevated—like that of the 
latest iPhone—but without any incentive to reduce and normalize 
the price for those waiting for the price reduction. In fact, per the 
principles of supply and demand, drug companies will spend 
billions of dollars on aggressive marketing strategies to promote 
more of their high-margin prescription drugs (like the Teslas and 
iPhones) and thus achieve higher profits.114 With profits feeding 
marketing expenses and further profits, and buyer power severely 
diminished, price equilibrium is nearly impossible to achieve. 
2. Long-term conditions ensure demand, further distorting 
price equilibrium 
Long-term conditions further weaken buyer power.115 Those 
with chronic health conditions, such as diabetes, congestive heart 
failure, and Parkinson’s disease, depend on medications to manage 
symptoms.116  Additionally, one in twenty-five adults is living with 
 
 113. See Ginger Skinner, To Get the Lowest Drug Prices It Pays to Shop Around, CONSUMER 
REP. (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/drug-prices/why-drug-costs-keep 
-rising-what-you-can-do-about-it/. 
 114. See Peterson, supra note 8 (“The companies raised prices—not to fund research to 
discover new drugs—but to boost profits for executives and investors.”). 
 115. David Ferguson, Most Healthcare Providers Unprepared for Longitudinal Care, 
FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Dec. 2, 2015, 11:01 AM), http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/healthcare 
/most-healthcare-providers-unprepared-for-longitudinal-care. 
 116. See, e.g., Diabetes: Symptoms and Causes, MAYO CLINIC (July 31, 2014), http:// 
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/diabetes/basics/complications/con-20033091; 
Understand Heart Failure, AM. HEART ASS’N, http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Condi 
tions/HeartFailure/Heart-Failure_UCM_002019_SubHomePage.jsp (last visited Dec. 30, 
2017) (“Although it can be difficult to live with a chronic condition like heart failure, you can 
learn to manage the symptoms and live a full and enjoyable life.”); Understanding Parkinson’s, 
PARKINSON’S FOUND., http://www.pdf.org/about_pd (last visited Dec. 30, 2017). Wellbutrin 
(an antipsychotic) and diltiazem (for heart rhythm problems) must be taken daily—
sometimes up to four times a day. Diltiazem (Oral Route), MAYO CLINIC, http://www 
.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/diltiazem-oral-route/proper-use/DRG-20071775 
(“For oral dosage form (tablets): Adults—At first, 30 milligrams (mg) four times a day before 
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a debilitating mental illness—including bipolar disorder and long-
term recurring major depression.117 In fact, one in six Americans 
takes psychiatric medication, and eight out of ten of those report 
long-term use.118 While much controversy surrounds the use of 
psychotropic medications, they can often both improve symptoms 
and increase the effectiveness of other treatments, like psycho-
therapy.119 Overall, this guaranteed demand removes these con-
sumers’ ability to choose to forego the drug product, tipping the 
 
meals and at bedtime. Your doctor may increase your dose if needed.”); Medications for 
Arrhythmia, AM. HEART ASS’N, http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Conditions/Arrhyth 
mia/PreventionTreatmentofArrhythmia/Medications-for-Arrhythmia_UCM_301990_Arti 
cle.jsp#.WdlBMbpFzIU; Lisa Rapaport, Many Patients Skip Prescribed Drugs After a Heart 
Attack, REUTERS (June 3, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-heart-medication/ma 
ny-patients-skip-prescribed-drugs-after-a-heartattackidUSKBN0OJ2M720150603; Wellbutrin 
SR, RXLIST, http://www.rxlist.com/wellbutrin-sr-drug.htm (“The usual adult target dose 
for WELLBUTRIN SR is 300 mg per day, given as 150 mg twice daily.”); Lisa Rapaport, Many 
Patients Skip Prescribed Drugs After MI, REUTERS (June 2, 2015), https://uk.reuters.com 
/article/us-heart-medication/many-patients-skip-prescribed-drugs-after-mi-idUKKBN0OI2 
KU20150602. 
 117. E.g., Shaunak A. Ajinkya, Pradeep R. Jadhav & Shruti Rajamani, Which Is A More 
Debilitating Disorder Schizophrenia or Dysthymia?—A Comparative Study, 9 J. CLINICAL & 
DIAGNOSTIC RES. 1, 1 (2015) (“Schizophrenia and Dysthymia are debilitating disorders that 
affect general health and functioning.”); Living with a Mental Health Condition, NAT’L 
ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/Find-Support/Living-with-a-Men 
tal-Health-Condition (last visited Dec. 30, 2017) (“[A]cross the population, 1 in every 25 
adults is living with a serious mental health condition such as schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder or long-term recurring major depression.”); ’Monkey Mind’: When Debilitating 
Anxiety Takes Over, NPR (July 3, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/03/156 
200170/monkey-mind-when-debilitating-anxiety-takes-over (“For some, anxiety can be 
much more than just sweaty palms and quivering hands. It can be a debilitating condition 
with severe physical and mental effects.”). 
 118. Thomas J. Moore & Donald R. Mattison, Adult Utilization of Psychiatric Drugs and 
Differences by Sex, Age, and Race, 177 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 274, 274 (2017) (“[An 
estimated] 11.5% of adults reported taking prescription medication for ‘problems with 
emotions, nerves, or mental health’ in 2011.”); Sara G. Miller, 1 in 6 Americans Takes a Psych-
iatric Drug, SCI. AM. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/1-in-6 
-americans-takes-a-psychiatric-drug/ (“[M]ore than eight in 10 adults who were taking 
psychiatric drugs reported long-term use . . . .”). 
 119. Laura Weiss Roberts & Shaili Jain, Ethical Issues in Pharmacology, PSYCHIATRIC 
TIMES (May 7, 2011), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/articles/ethical-issues-psycho 
pharmacology (“There are also concerns about the widespread application (some would say 
overprescription) of psychotropics—a controversy that is further fueled by the fact that 
nonpsychiatric providers are the source of most psychotropic prescriptions in the United 
States.”); see also Mental Illness: Diagnosis & Treatment, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayo 
clinic.org/diseases-conditions/mental-illness/basics/treatment/con-20033813 (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2017) (“Although psychiatric medications don’t cure mental illness, they can often 
significantly improve symptoms. Psychiatric medications can also help make other treat-
ments, such as psychotherapy, more effective.”). 
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power heavily in favor of the drug producer.120 For some, medi-
cation and other mental health services mean the difference 
between holding down a steady job or complete dependence on 
disability programs.121 Interestingly, providing access to psycho-
tropic medication saves the U.S. healthcare system around $25 
billion annually in reduced admissions to mental institutions.122 
The inverse has also been demonstrated. “[S]tudies have shown 
that when patients’ access to psychotropic drugs is arbitrarily 
restricted by insurers, patients use hospital care at a cost to those 
insurers that greatly exceeds the drug cost savings they foolishly 
attained.”123 This is because regular adherence to costly medica-
tions is critical to a stable health condition and, thus, to being a 
productive member of society.124 Unlike in normal markets for 
Teslas or iPhones, the poor cannot always wait for the rich to buy 
enough of the prescription medication so that prices deflate 
enough. Deciding to forego the latest iPhone or Tesla does not 
carry the same consequences as foregoing psychiatric or heart 
medication. Producers of drugs for chronic health conditions are 
practically guaranteed a constant, long-term demand of a mostly 
inelastic market. In fact, eighty-six percent of all healthcare 
 
 120. See Rapaport, supra note 116 (“‘Ultimately, regardless of the reason, patient non-
adherence to medications after a heart attack has been associated with poor outcomes—these 
can include repeat hospitalization, progression of their underlying disease, or even reduced 
survival,’ said Mathews, a researcher at Duke University Medical Center in Durham, 
North Carolina.”). 
 121. Robert E. Drake, Jonathan S. Skinner, Gary R. Bond & Howard H. Goldman, Social 
Security and Mental Illness: Reducing Disability with Supported Employment, 28 HEALTH AFF. 
761, 761 (2009) (suggesting that providing supported employment along with “mental health 
care would improve financial security” of people with serious mental illnesses and “could 
even save the government money”). 
 122. J.D. Kleinke, The Price of Progress: Prescription Drugs in the Health Care Market, 20 
HEALTH AFF. 43, 47 (2001) (“According to a study by Lichtenberg, ‘Drug treatments have 
saved the cost of keeping about 400,000 patients in mental institutions about $25 bil-
lion annually.’”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., Kimberly Holland & Valencia Higuera, The Dangers of Abruptly Stopping 
Antidepressants, HEALTHLINE (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.healthline.com/health/depression 
/dangers-of-stopping-antidepressants (“Quitting without consulting your doctor can be life-
threatening.”); see also Rapaport, supra note 116 (“‘Ultimately, regardless of the reason, 
patient non-adherence to medications after a heart attack has been associated with poor 
outcomes—these can include repeat hospitalization, progression of their underlying disease, 
or even reduced survival,’ said Mathews, a researcher at Duke University Medical Center in 
Durham, North Carolina.”). 
 
5.SCHIEL_FIN_NOHEADER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/18  10:42 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
234 
spending is for patients with one or more chronic conditions.125 In 
this way, the pharmaceutical industry is unlike any other, not 
subject to normal market forces and consumer pressures. In other 
words, prices cannot reach equilibrium because buyers cannot 
refuse to buy, leaving sellers with little reason to cut prices.  
E. Summary: The Pharmaceutical Industry Cannot Be a Normal Market 
Consumers are relatively powerless to rein in drug companies’ 
prices. Near-constant demand and little buyer power tips the 
balance of power heavily in the hands of the drug companies. 
Without typical market forces to provide balance, the industry 
cannot achieve price equilibrium. Around the world, governments 
usually step in to help manage prices from getting out of control.126 
Yet American lawmakers have imposed relatively few price 
constraints on prescription drugs.127 Instead, Americans have 
chosen to depend on normal market forces and public opinion in 
order to curb these prices, with only minimal impact.128 Again, 
without aspects of normal markets like quality and price trans-
parency, independent buyers dealing directly with sellers, and 
monopolistic safeguards in the prescription drug market, basic 
supply and demand principles operate such that drug producers 
are free to set exorbitant prices.129 Only as more consumers feel the 
painful monetary losses through insurance premium hikes will this 
“price gouging” garner enough public attention to effectuate 
lower  prices.130 
 
 125. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, 
AHRQ PUB. NO. 14-0038, MULTIPLE CHRONIC CONDITIONS CHARTBOOK 7 (2014), https:// 
www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/professionals/prevention-chronic-care/deci 
sion/mcc/mccchartbook.pdf (“[Eighty-six percent] of healthcare spending is for patients 
with one or more chronic conditions.”). 
 126. See Asmundson, supra note 109 (“As a result, governments usually regulate such 
monopolies to ensure that they do not abuse their market power by setting prices too high.”). 
 127. Erin Fox, How Pharma Companies Game the System to Keep Drugs Expensive, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/how-pharma-companies-game-the-system 
-to-keep-drugs-expensive. 
 128. Jay Hancock, Everyone Wants to Reduce Drug Prices. So Why Can’t We Do It?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/sunday-review/prescription 
-drugs-prices.html. 
 129. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 97. 
 130. Is There a Cure for High Drug Prices?, CONSUMER REP., https://www.consumer 
reports.org/drugs/cure-for-high-drug-prices (last updated July 29, 2016). 
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With the healthcare industry hanging in the balance, this 
unrestrained market has ceded significant price control to profit-
amplifying corporations in the pharmaceutical industry.131 One 
physician remarked that the prices of cancer drugs have soared so 
high “that we are getting into areas that are almost unimaginable 
economically.”132 In the insurance industry, the ACA has begun to 
bring insurers’ margins to a reasonable level by enforcing the health 
insurance MLR regulation—with undeniable success at reducing 
waste.133 Yet the pharmaceutical industry has thus far eluded any 
such value mandate, despite similarities in market abnormalities 
and even starker shareholder manipulation than the insurance 
industry.134 Consequently, the abnormal market conditions, com-
bined with a lack of moderating regulations, have led to pronounc-
ed profit-taking in the pharmaceutical industry. 
III. PRONOUNCED PROFIT-TAKING EXISTS 
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Without normalizing market forces at play, pharmaceutical 
companies are left unchecked to reap skyrocketing profits. As they 
recoup their profits, these companies simultaneously neglect devel-
opment of some less profitable, albeit much-needed, drugs. 
A. The Pharmaceutical Industry Reaps Mammoth Profits 
The priority of for-profit corporations is to maximize the return 
on shareholders’ investments. The landmark case of Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co. noted explicitly that a business’s primary purpose is to 
amplify the “profit of the stockholders.”135 Although more obser-
vation than a binding rule, this “shareholder primacy norm” 
theory both captures and strengthens the widespread approach of 
 
 131. See Fox, supra note 127. 
 132. Gina Kolata, What Does It Cost to Create a Cancer Drug? Less Than You’d Think, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/health/cancer-drug-costs.html. 
 133. See PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 18. 
 134. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Martin Shkreli Resigns from Turing Pharmaceuticals, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/business/martin-shkreli-re 
signs-turing-drug-company.html. 
 135. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Marshall M. Magaro, 
Note, Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility Through the Shareholder-
Primacy Norm, 85 IND. L.J. 1149, 1153 (2010) (discussing shareholder wealth maximization). 
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pharmaceutical companies. Unlike other developed countries, the 
United States grants drug companies free rein to charge “whatever 
they want.”136 Medicare isn’t even allowed to negotiate drug 
prices.137 So, unhindered by normal market forces, the pharma-
ceutical industry has magnified this Dodge charge to amplify 
stockholder profit. 
The major drug companies’ profits are substantial. Generally 
included in the term “Big Pharma” are fifteen pharmaceutical 
giants, notably Johnson & Johnson ($276 billion market value), 
Novartis ($273 billion), and Roche ($248 billion).138 They enjoy 
significant yearly shareholder yields and profit margins.139 While 
the S&P 500 companies realize a median of 2% shareholder yields 
(or payouts to stockholders), those of Big Pharma are well above that; 
Pfizer’s shareholder yields, for example, were over 6% in 2015.140 As 
for average profit margins, the pharmaceutical industry was at the 
top of a 2013 Forbes study, right next to the banking industry, at a 
19% profit margin.141 Five of the Big Pharma companies made profit 
margins of 20% or higher.142 In comparison, the industries with the 
next-highest average profit margins were the media, 12%; oil and 
 
 136. Deangelis, supra note 29, at 30–31 (“What has accounted for the pharmaceutical 
companies’ very large profit margins? For one thing, the United States, unlike other devel-
oped countries, allows pharmaceutical companies to charge whatever they want as long as 
they do not collude with one another in setting the prices. In other words, these companies 
can charge whatever the market will bear. For example, Solvadi, Gilead’s hepatitis C drug, 
costs $1,000 for each pill, which amounted to sales of $3.5 billion between April and June 
of 2015.”). 
 137. Id. at 31 (“Making matters worse, the US Congress, influenced by pharmaceutical 
lobbyists, has not allowed Medicare to negotiate drug prices, as do most health care systems, 
HMOs, and some insurance companies. In those countries that negotiate the prices of their 
national insurance plans with Big Pharma, most drugs sell for much less. Obviously, 
lobbyists for the pharmaceutical industry in the United States have been very successful.”). 
 138. Compare Williams, supra note 7 (identifying market values of pharmaceutical 
companies), with Dan Caplinger, How Much Is the Coca-Cola Company Worth?, MOTLEY FOOL 
(Sept. 6, 2016, 12:16 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/09/06/how-much-is-the 
-coca-cola-company-worth.aspx (identifying Coca-Cola’s net worth at $188–213 billion). 
 139. See generally Jeremy Jones, Calculating Shareholder Yield, YOUNG RES. & PUB., 
INC. (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.youngresearch.com/authors/jeremyjones/calculating 
-shareholder-yield (showing that shareholder yields are returned capital divided by 
market capitalization). 
 140. Williams, supra note 7. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Anderson, supra note 32 (identifying the companies as Pfizer, Hoffmann-La 
Roche, AbbVie, GlaxoSmithKline, and Eli Lilly). 
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gas, 8%; and car manufacturers, 6%.143 Big Pharma’s profits are 
almost twice those of the next-highest industry. This trend doesn’t 
seem to be changing any time soon, considering that another Forbes 
study in 2015 found the average profit margin of healthcare 
technology companies was now 21%.144 The 2015 profit margins for 
Johnson & Johnson were 22%; Roche, 20%; and Novartis, 36% (when 
comparing profits over sales).145 But the company Forbes found to be 
setting the pace was Gilead Sciences, with a profit margin nearly 53% 
over a one-year period.146 With margins sometimes three-fold those 
of other profitable industries, it’s no wonder these companies 
attract  investors.147 
Maintaining these returns necessitates consistently elevating 
pharmaceutical prices. Despite the recent upsurge in the proportion 
of cheaper generic versions used to fill prescriptions (82% in 2016, 
compared to 66% in 2010), brand versions have maintained their 
roughly 78% market share of overall profits.148 To maintain those 
profits, the drug companies implemented 17% annual price hikes, at 
a time when general inflation averaged 1.62%.149 In recent years, the 
news has exposed instances of price gouging and opportunistic 
profit-taking. For example, Europe and Canada sold the generic 
drug deflazacort, a steroid used to treat children with Duchenne 
 
 143. See id. 
 144. See supra note 7. 
 145. JOHNSON & JOHNSON CO., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) (Jan. 3, 2016); NOVARTIS, 
NOVARTIS ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (2015), https://www.novartis.com/sites/www.novartis
.com/files/novartis-annual-report-2015-en.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2018); ROCHE GROUP, 
FINANCE REPORT 2015 (2015), http://www.roche.com/dam/jcr:74af99eb-b51a-4f13-88b2 
-aacaf9f53c0c/en/fb15e.pdf. 
 146. See supra note 7. 
 147. Hugh Dive, Investing in Biotech and Pharma, AURORA FUNDS MGMT., http://www 
.aurorafunds.com.au/investing-in-biotech-and-pharma (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (“Biotech-
nology and pharmaceuticals are probably the most seductive and exciting sectors of the 
market to invest in. Not only can investors have the warm and fuzzy feeling that they are 
helping humanity (an emotion not readily generated by buying shares in Westpac or BHP), but 
when drugs or devices are developed and successfully adopted, it can be very profitable.”). 
 148. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ASS’N, HEALTH OF AMERICA REPORT, RISING COSTS FOR 
PATENTED DRUGS DRIVE GROWTH OF PHARMACEUTICAL SPENDING IN THE U.S. (May 3, 2017), 
https://www.bcbs.com/sites/default/files/file-attachments/health-of-america-report/BC 
BS.HealthOfAmericaReport.RisingCostsPatentedDrugs_1.pdf. 
 149. Id; see also Historical Inflation Rates 1914-2018, US INFLATION CALCULATOR, http:// 
www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
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muscular dystrophy, at a price between $1000 to $2000 per year.150 
Yet the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved 
Marathon Pharmaceuticals to sell the same drug in the United 
States for $89,000 (a 6000% price increase) under the brand name 
Emflaza.151 Other notable examples include Turing Pharma-
ceuticals’ Daraprim ($750 per pill, as increased from $13.50), and 
AMAG Pharmaceuticals’ Makena ($1500 per pill, while a different 
but similar drug was sold for $20).152 Although Turing Pharma-
ceuticals’ former CEO Martin Shkreli was recently convicted for 
fraud, the conviction was for securities and conspiracy but had 
nothing to do with Daraprim price hikes.153 Altogether, there seem 
to be few checks on these price hikes—especially when there are 
such profits to be made!  
B. Big Pharma’s Expenses Spur Their Profits 
The cost of moving a drug to the profit-making stage is signi-
ficant. It takes ten to fifteen years to research and develop one 
drug154 at an average cost between $648 million to $2.65 billion.155 
Many drugs fail at various steps along the way, resulting in mil-
lions of dollars of lost funds.156 Estimates suggest only one out of 
every 5000 to 10,000 drugs makes it to clinical trials.157 From there, 
only three out of ten are profitable, and only one of these three 
becomes a blockbuster drug grossing at least $1 billion per year.158 
Patents compensate for these risks and protect a company from 
competition, maximizing a drug’s return. Yet over the last few 
 
 150. Matthew Herper, Why Did That Drug Price Increase 6,000%? It’s the Law, FORBES 
(Feb. 10, 2017, 1:52 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2017/02/10/a-6000 
-price-hike-should-give-drug-companies-a-disgusting-sense-of-deja-vu/#348085ca71f5. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id.; see also Pollack, supra note 134. 
 153. Aaron Smith, Martin Shkreli Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison for Fraud, CNN MONEY 
(Mar. 9, 2018, 5:25 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/03/09/news/martin-shkreli-sentencing 
/index.html. 
 154. Paula Tironi, Pharmaceutical Pricing: A Review of Proposals to Improve Access and 
Affordability of Prescription Drugs, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 311, 324 (2010). 
 155. See Cost to Develop and Win Marketing Approval for a New Drug is $2.6 Billion, supra 
note 84 (“Developing a new prescription medicine that gains marketing approval, a process 
often lasting longer than a decade, is estimated to cost $2,558 million.”). 
 156. See Tironi, supra note 154. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Anderson, supra note 32. 
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years, several prominent patents have expired, allowing increased 
competition and falling profits.159 These patent expiries will cost the 
industry an unprecedented $240 billion in the decade between 2010 
and 2020.160 
To offset costs and maximize profits, the pharmaceutical 
industry promotes sales by spending a staggering amount of 
money on advertising. Nine Big Pharma companies spend sub-
stantially more on sales and marketing than on R&D (Johnson & 
Johnson, Novartis, Pfizer, Sanofi, Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, Astra-
Zeneca, Eli Lilly, and AbbVie).161 While most other industries spend 
an average of 10% of revenue on marketing, these Big Pharma 
companies averaged over twice that with 23% in 2013.162  While 
different business models call for varying proportions of marketing 
expenditures, only the consumer packaged goods industry ap-
proaches this proportion.163 Spending a quarter of some of the most 
substantial profits in the world on marketing is significant. By com-
parison, Big Pharma R&D expenditures averaged only 16% of 
revenue.164 To note, Johnson & Johnson spent over twice as much 
on marketing ($17.5 billion) as R&D ($8.2 billion).165 It is true that it 
 
 159. See id. 
 160. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceuticals Industry Facing Fundamental Change, BBC News 
(Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-29659537. 
 161. Id.; see also Elizabeth Whitman, How the US Subsidizes Cheap Drugs for Europe, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-us-subsidizes-cheap 
-drugs-europe-2112662 (referencing Makovsky Instagram tweet indicating pharmaceutical 
companies spend more on marketing than research). 
 162. See Anderson, supra note 32 (featuring data from which to calculate marketing 
budget as a percent of revenue: Johnson & Johnson 25%, Novartis 25%, Pfizer 22%, Roche 
18%, Sanofi 20%, Merck 22%, GSK 24%, AstraZeneca 28%, Eli Lilly 25%, AbbVie 23%); Sarah 
Brady, What Percent of Revenue Do Publicly Traded Companies Spend on Marketing and Sales?, 
VITAL, https://vtldesign.com/digital-marketing/content-marketing-strategy/percent-of-re 
venue-spent-on-marketing-sales/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2018); Christine Moorman, Who Has 
the Biggest Marketing Budgets?, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2014, 11:41 AM), https://www.forbes 
.com/sites/christinemoorman/2014/03/05/who-has-the-biggest-marketing-budgets/#18a 
8dc6a24 (“To put these figures in perspective, The CMO Survey reports that marketing 
budgets represent approximately 10.9% of overall firm budgets.”). 
 163. Marketing Budgets Vary by Industry, WALL STREET J.: DELOITTE, http://deloitte 
.wsj.com/cmo/2017/01/24/who-has-the-biggest-marketing-budgets. 
 164. See Anderson, supra note 32 (featuring data from which to calculate R&D budget 
as a percent of revenue: Johnson & Johnson 12%, Novartis 17%, Pfizer 13%, Roche 18%, 
Sanofi 14%, Merck 17%, GSK 13%, AstraZeneca 17%, Eli Lilly 24%, AbbVie 15%).  
 165. Id.; see also Kim T. Gordon, Defining Sales and Marketing, ENTREPRENEUR, https:// 
www.entrepreneur.com/article/46086 (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (indicating sales and mar-
keting expenses can include networking activities and advertisements). 
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markets and sells more than just pharmaceuticals (medical devices, 
household supplies, etc.). But considering that pharmaceutical-
specific advertising has grown more than any other advertising 
category in the last four years, it is reasonable to assume Johnson & 
Johnson has similarly focused its advertising expenses on its phar-
maceutics.166 Last year the pharmaceutical industry spent $6 billion 
in advertisements alone, mostly via television.167 
This advertising may be not only exorbitant but also wasteful. 
Notably, the United States and New Zealand are the only two 
countries in the world to permit this type of product claims adver-
tising.168 In 2015 the American Medical Association (AMA) called 
for an outright ban of this direct-to-consumer advertising.169 The 
organization argued that it “inflates demand” because inquisitive 
patients, armed with a brand name and a sunny testimonial, arrive 
at their prescriber appointments asking why they can’t have access 
to these brand drugs.170 Yet, per the AMA, this deceptive consumer-
targeted advertising cannot correct the information asymmetries 
inherent in the physician-patient relationship. As discussed in 
section II.A.1, patients still lack the extensive medical training that 
guides physicians’ prescription decisions. A quick television ad-
vertisement with “glossed-over” side effects cannot effectively 
educate patients enough about price, quality, or alternative options 
to make them truly informed consumers.171 Yet those prescribers 
who do have the requisite education often feel pressured to pre-
scribe the higher-priced drugs to please these patients, irrespective 
of true need.172 Thus, they prescribe more of these medications than 
is necessary. By providing just enough information to slightly offset 
 
 166. Bruce Horovitz & Julie Appleby, Prescription Drug Costs Are on the Rise; So Are 
the TV Ads Promoting Them, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 20, 2017), http://khn.org/news 
/prescription-drug-costs-are-on-the-rise-so-are-the-tv-ads-promoting-them; INT’L TRADE 
ADMIN., 2016 TOP MARKETS REPORT: MEDICAL DEVICES 2 (2016), http://www.trade.gov 
/topmarkets/pdf/Medical_Devices_Executive_Summary.pdf (“The major U.S. medical 
device companies include . . . Johnson & Johnson.”). 
 167. Horovitz & Appleby, supra note 166. 
 168. C. Lee Ventola, Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Therapeutic or Toxic?, 
36 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 669, 669 (2011). 
 169. Horovitz & Appleby, supra note 166. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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these information asymmetries, the advertising confuses the pre-
scriber’s role in the patient-consumer’s decision. In the end, there is 
little evidence to show that direct-to-consumer marketing provides 
any real benefit to the patient.173  
In all fairness, the required R&D expenditures are substantial in 
this industry and provide many jobs that help the economy. 
However, it is clear that Big Pharma’s investing in advertising and 
promotion of the most expensive brand name drugs ultimately 
drives up pharmaceutical sales and, thus, profits for the stock-
holders.174 And there may not be as many benefits to this adver-
tising as the drug industry would like to claim. 
C. High Prices and Low Returns Lead to Inaccessibility Problems 
The skewed drug market often renders much-needed drugs 
inaccessible. A 2010 article reports that twenty-nine percent of 
adults reported neglecting to fill a prescription in the last two years 
due to its impractical price.175 Twenty-three percent reported 
cutting pills in half or skipping doses so their medications would 
last longer.176 This type of behavior increased the rate of hos-
pitalizations and ER visits.177 The prohibitive prices frustrate the 
most cost-efficient care and result in wasted resources and unsafe 
physical conditions.  
At the same time, development of much-needed drugs is 
ignored. Drug companies lack the incentives to spend resources 
developing products that, while unprofitable, would treat neglected 
conditions (Chagas disease, filarial disease, leishmaniasis, etc.)—
 
 173. See S. Gilbody, P. Wilson & I. Watt, Benefits and Harms of Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising: A Systematic Review, 14 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 246, 246 (2005) (“Direct 
to consumer advertising is associated with increased prescription of advertised products and 
there is substantial impact on patients’ request for specific drugs and physicians’ confidence 
in prescribing. No additional benefits in terms of health outcomes were demonstrated.”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Tironi, supra note 154, at 317; see also Turner, supra note 56 (Kaiser Family 
Foundation reports this number at 8% from 2004 to 2014); see also Cynthia Cox & Bradley 
Sawyer, How Does Cost Affect Access to Care?, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Jan. 
17, 2018), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/cost-affect-access-care (re-
porting that in 2016 nineteen percent of adults in worse health decided to delay or forego 
filling prescription drugs). 
 176. Tironi, supra note 154, at 317. 
 177. See id. at 322. 
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both in the developing world and in the United States.178 The devel-
opment of cures for any one of these diseases would not provide 
the “blockbuster” dividend payouts that have become the specialty 
of this industry.179 And public pressure to address these health 
conditions is, alone, insufficient to override the entrenched profit-
maximizing mindset.180 Consequently, drug companies have few 
incentives to dedicate the funds needed for this R&D, leaving these 
drugs undeveloped and the related health conditions untreated.181 
In summary, without the normal, steadying free-market forces 
in place, the mandate to maximize wealth leads to unfettered price 
increases and mammoth profit-taking. While R&D expenses are 
admittedly substantial, they do not justify the excessive profits 
taken or marketing expenditures spent by drug companies.182 
Ultimately, desperately needed drugs become impossibly expen-
sive or otherwise inaccessible. Some form of regulation is needed 
to manage the out-of-control gains and drug inaccessibility. 
IV. PROPOSAL: APPLY A MODIFIED MLR REGULATION 
TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
To help right this abnormal market and curb unnecessary price 
increases, the government should enact a value-focused pharma-
ceutical MLR regulation—patterned after the health insurance 
MLR regulation. As explained in Part I, this regulation requires 
insurers to rebate funds if they spend less than the designated 
amount on value-enhancing activities, such as medical care. 
If this regulation were to be applied to the pharmaceutical 
industry, many of the same effects that have already been observed 
in the insurance industry would also be observed here. First, it 
would help right the abnormal market. Admittedly, this regulation 
alone would not fix the information and control asymmetries in this 
market, nor render transparent pricing more practical in every 
situation. Neither would it turn the highly inelastic market more 
elastic (by more closely linking demand to price). However, it 
 
 178. See Anderson, supra note 160. See generally DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES 
INITIATIVE, https://www.dndi.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
 179. See Anderson, supra note 29. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See Kolata, supra note 132. 
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would likely improve transparency by compelling disclosure of the 
aggregate amount spent in certain cost categories to demonstrate 
compliance with the imposed ratio. And even if transparency is not 
improved, this regulation would fill the role usually played by 
price transparency in normal markets by providing a counter-
weight to the drug companies’ selling power by limiting their 
potential profits and, thus, their prices. Even if elasticity—the link 
between price and demand—is not improved, prices would be 
constrained by this normalizing force (instead of rising unre-
strainedly). Big Pharma would no longer charge “whatever they 
want.” If Big Pharma did not reduce prices themselves to keep their 
profits below the threshold, they would be compelled to rebate 
the excess.  
Second, this regulation would also address some of the chal-
lenges posed by the third-party insurer. Even though consumers 
would still be shielded from the true costs of healthcare, the 
regulation would put some limitation on sellers from implement-
ing unchecked price hikes simply to maximize their own profits. In 
this way, insurance companies could still play a continuous role 
in mitigating the financial losses felt by any one individual, includ-
ing those least able to pay, while also reducing the tension be-
tween supplier and buyer power so that it would not be as skewed 
toward suppliers.  
Third, this regulation could relieve some of the monopolistic 
features of this industry. Patents could still provide some insurance 
against the financial risk of research and development, but the 
financial returns from the patents would have some type of a check. 
Prices and profits could even normalize. Furthermore, this regu-
lation might accomplish the goals of proposed government price 
negotiations by, again, restraining seller power and checking 
prices. The overall effect would be to improve the balance between 
supplier and buyer power, thereby establishing price equilibrium. 
While this market may never achieve normalcy, this measure could 
correct it substantially. 
Similar to the health insurance industry, MLR regulation would 
provide some check on unlimited, exorbitant profits—currently an 
impossible feat considering the heavy-handed seller power. Even-
tually, Big Pharma might stop placing so much emphasis on 
unneeded expenditures, like wasteful advertising, since it wouldn’t 
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be allowed to keep more than a certain percentage of the returns. 
Also, similar to the health insurance industry, this regulation 
would incentivize players to invest in value-promoting research 
and development, and other improvements; it would also refine 
efficiencies in less value-adding areas, like pharmacy benefit mana-
ger costs and profits. And finally, like in the insurance industry, 
MLR regulation has the potential to cut billions of dollars in 
American healthcare costs, potentially even shifting some of the 
cost burden away from American taxpayers. 
The adopted pharmaceutical ratio could mirror the health 
insurance’s 80:20 ratio (80% medical loss and 20% other). But as 
discussed above, expenditure ratios within the pharmaceutical 
industry are dissimilar to any other industry (17% R&D, 23% sales 
and marketing (S&M), 30% manufacturing, and 21% profits).183 
Expecting a blanket 80:20 ratio in the drug industry therefore seems 
unreasonable, if not drastic. Again, the purpose of the MLR regula-
tion is not to impinge on financial viability but to impose guardrails 
around expenditures to ensure a certain level of value for the 
consumer. Erecting these guardrails requires designating each cost 
category as either value-contributing or lesser-value-contributing; 
analogizable to separating out the fat (or “other”) from the meat (or 
medical loss). Under the ACA’s regulation, the insurance compa-
ny’s value-contributing expenditures—denoted as medical loss—
include medical claims, quality improvement activities, taxes, and 
licensing fees.184 Profits, administrative fees, marketing, agent 
commissions, and community benefit expenditures constitute the 
lesser-value-contributing, or “other,” category.185  
 
 183. See Deangelis, supra note 29, at 30 (“In 2013 the profit margin for pharmaceutical 
companies ranged from 10% to 42%, with an average of 18%. Pfizer was at the top of the 
profit list, and 4 other companies (Hoffman-La Roche, AbbVie, GlaxoSmithKline, and Eli 
Lilly) had profit margins of more than 20%. As a point of reference, the profit margin of 
pharmaceutical companies was essentially the same as that of banks, but the banks’ range of 
profit was lower, from 5% to 29%.”); Adams, supra note 30 (“On average last year, the top 10 
Big Pharmas spent just over 17% of their top line on research, with GlaxoSmithKline spend-
ing the second least in percentage terms at 12.9%, and the least in absolute numbers at £3.62 
billion ($4.49 billion).”); Williams, supra note 7 (explaining pharmaceutical companies had 
average profit margins of 19%). 
 184. See Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), supra note 26. 
 185. See PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 18, at 4–5; Medical Loss Ratio, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/medical-loss-ratio-MLR/ (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
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In order to implement a similar regulation in the pharma-
ceutical industry, this industry’s major cost categories should be 
evaluated for their value contribution, the inherent incentives 
already at play, and the effect of this regulation on these incentives. 
The rest of Part IV will examine each of the pharmaceutical 
companies’ major cost categories for current incentives to limit or 
increase expenditures. Each section will conclude with a recom-
mendation regarding which side of the ratio (medical loss or 
“other”) to assign each cost category. Ultimately, this Note recom-
mends a 40:60 ratio for the pharmaceutical industry. 
A. Profits Are “Other” 
The pharmaceutical industry’s substantial profits can comfort-
ably be assigned to the “other” category.186 Importantly, this does 
not mean that drug companies should be bereft of profits. Profits 
and incentives play an important role in the economy. The MLR 
regulation simply puts guidelines around expenses to avoid unfair 
extremes in profits and other administrative costs while requiring 
value for consumers’ ever-increasing healthcare dollars.187 Value 
returned to the consumer is the ultimate line between medical loss 
and other expenses.188 Corporate profits provide relatively less, if 
any, value to the consumer; consequently, they fall on the “other” 
side of the MLR ratio. 
B. Manufacturing and Distribution Are “Other” 
Manufacturing and distribution costs, at times between 27% to 
30% of Big Pharma’s revenue, make up the bulk of the value, or 
“medical loss,” that is provided to drug consumers.189 The drugs 
that are manufactured and distributed to consumers save lives, ease 
suffering, and improve health. Considering that this constitutes the 
 
 186. See supra Part III. 
 187. “The 80/20 rule is ensuring that insurance companies provide consumers value 
for their premium dollars.” The 80/20 Rule: Providing Value and Rebates to Millions of Customers, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Forms 
-Reports-and-Other-Resources/mlr-rebates06212012a.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
 188. See id. 
 189. KIRCHHOFF, supra note 29; Basu et al., supra note 29, at 30 (“In the pharmaceutical 
industry, costs attributed to manufacturing are a major part of a company’s total expenses.”). 
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major value that Big Pharma provides, it might naturally fall on the 
“medical loss” side of the ratio, similar to the insurance companies’ 
medical claims expense category. But this comparison is mostly 
surface-level. Health insurance companies are mainly responsible 
for the financial coverage of medical expenses—essentially a 
transfer of funds. 190 But they are not involved in the actual delivery 
of the medical care. In contrast, pharmaceutical companies are 
responsible for the payment and the actual manufacturing and 
distribution of the drugs themselves. Considering that there are 
significantly more steps along the pharmaceutical supply chain 
than for the payout of medical claims, and that drug companies 
control more aspects of these expenses than do insurance 
companies, these costs are more susceptible to potential abuse.191 
And because the “medical loss” side determines the amount of 
profits a Big Pharma company could keep, assigning manufactur-
ing and distribution expenses to the “medical loss” side would 
incentivize Big Pharma to inflate each step they controlled so as to 
be able to keep additional profits.   
In order to determine whether pharmaceutical manufacturing 
and distribution costs should be considered “medical loss” or 
“other,” this subsection will analyze (1) the significant control that 
the drug industry has over this cost category, (2) the potential for 
abuse of this power and the result of misaligning the incentives by 
assigning manufacturing costs to the “medical loss” side of the 
MLR ratio, and (3) possible solutions to correct this misalignment. 
Analyzing these factors highlights the differences between the 
insurance industry’s medical claims payouts and Big Pharma’s 
manufacturing and distribution costs. The differences in control 
and thus the potential for abuse of this cost category indicate that 
manufacturing and distribution expenses should not be grouped 
on the medical loss side of the ratio, since this could inflate that side 
of the ratio and by extension inflate the “other” side of the ratio, 
including profits. The analysis will conclude that this industry’s 
 
 190. What Is Health Insurance?, MED. NEWS TODAY, https://www.medicalnewstoday
.com/info/health-insurance (last updated Jan. 5, 2016). 
 191. Allen Jacques, 2017 Trends & Transformations in the Pharma Supply Chain, PHARMA-
CEUTICAL PROCESSING (Dec. 29, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.pharmpro.com/article/2016 
/12/2017-trends-transformations-pharma-supply-chain (“The pharmaceutical supply chain 
is one of the most complex supply chains in the world.”). 
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manufacturing and distribution costs should be categorized as 
“other” to maintain the incentive to not inflate these costs in order 
to keep more profits, but instead, run these processes efficiently. 
1. Big Pharma exercises significant control over manufacturing and 
distribution costs 
Supply chains in the pharmaceutical industry are some of the 
most complex in the world.192 For instance, drug production can 
start overseas with ingredients arriving from various locations.193 
For drugs entering the United States, the facilities and procedures 
must meet the strict standards of both U.S. and international 
regulators.194  In addition to regulatory complexity, the physical 
process of getting drugs to consumers is itself no small feat. Once a 
drug is manufactured, it is transported to numerous countries; 
stored in warehouses; processed by distributors; and delivered to 
retailers, hospitals, pharmacies, clinics, and so on until it eventually 
arrives in the hands of the consumer.195 These supply chains are fur-
ther complicated by sophisticated international contracts, intricate 
distribution channels, business-to-business price negotiations, im-
portation tariffs, labor regulations, equipment maintenance, phar-
macy benefit managers, etc.196 There are many ways that Big 
Pharma could manipulate their expenses so as to inflate their costs 
and thus inflate the profit side of the ratio. 
Although, emphasizing the pharmaceutical industry’s logistical 
challenges is not meant to oversimplify the insurance industry. 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Basu et al., supra note 29, at 30–31. 
 194. Mike Benson, Pharmaceutical Industry Regulations, MKT. REALIST (Jan. 22, 2015, 
11:06 AM), http://marketrealist.com/2015/01/pharmaceutical-industry-regulations. 
 195. Id.; see also THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., FOLLOW THE PILL: UNDERSTANDING 
THE U.S. COMMERCIAL PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN (2005), http://avalere.com/research 
/docs/Follow_the_Pill.pdf. 
 196. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, UNDERSTANDING THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
VALUE CHAIN (2014), https://www.scribd.com/document/271050319/Understanding-Phar 
maceutical-Value-Chain-pdf; Elaine M. Whittington, Types of Contracts, INST. FOR SUPPLY 
MGMT. (1994), https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/pubs/Proceedings/conf 
proceedingsdetail.cfm?ItemNumber=5238&SSO=1; see Drafting Commercial Contracts for the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, FALCONBURY, https://falconbury.co.uk/product/details/234/draft 
ing-commercial-contracts-for-the-pharmaceutical-industry (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (“In such 
a highly regulated industry, understanding the key challenges of negotiation and drafting 
an effective and watertight contract on an international level is a complex topic.”). 
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Insurers’ hospital reimbursements are based predominantly on per 
diem amounts or fee-for-service schedules, which must be nego-
tiated annually between each hospital and insurer with their indi-
vidual bargaining powers.197 Furthermore, insurance actuaries 
must navigate market regulation and draw on historical experience 
when developing rates.198 Insurance is complex to be sure. 
However, the ability to inflate this expense category is different 
in the pharmaceutical industry. While an insurer may dictate which 
hospital or doctor is available to its enrollees, the insurer is not 
on the hospitals’ administration team negotiating supply contracts, 
running the nursing units, or managing doctors. Insurers are a 
step removed from the management decision process.199 Drug 
companies, however, exert significantly more control over their 
major expenses. They directly oversee most of their products—
from negotiating research and development contracts, to running 
manufacturing plants.200 Phrases like “integrate out global opera-
tions” or “reduce manufacturing costs” make good business sense 
to the pharmaceutical industry but sound out of place when 
applied to the insurance industry’s control over hospitals or 
pharmacies.201 Insurance companies do not develop restructuring 
plans for clinics or merge unprofitable hospitals. The differences in 
each industry’s ability to control the largest portion of its costs has 
critical ramifications—and deserves thoughtful consideration. Ulti-
mately, this area is much more susceptible to abuse than the 
regulated insurance claims payouts.  
 
 197. Uwe E. Reinhardt, How Do Hospitals Get Paid? A Primer, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2009, 
6:40 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/how-do-hospitals-get-paid 
-a-primer. 
 198. Kurt Wrobel, Opinion, On Individual Health Insurance Reform, Actuarial Details 
Matter, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2017, 12:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/01
/24/on-individual-health-insurance-reform-actuarial-details-matter/#1945846e62b1. 
 199. Sandhya Somashekhar & Ariana Eunjung Cha, Insurers Restricting Choice of Doctors 
and Hospitals to Keep Costs Down, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2013), http://wapo.st/17rq8bF?tid= 
ss_mail&utm_term=.8d7e47dbc3a7 (“[I]nsurers are restricting their choice of doctors and 
hospitals in order to keep costs low, and . . . many of the plans exclude top-rated hospitals. . . . 
In most cases, the decision was about the cost of care.”). 
 200. Merck Closing 8 Plants, 8 Research Sites, CBS NEWS (July 8, 2010, 9:10 AM), https:// 
www.cbsnews.com/news/merck-closing-8-plants-8-research-sites. 
 201. Id. 
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2. Manufacturing and distribution costs are susceptible to abuse by Big 
Pharma, and thus, these costs would benefit from being grouped in the 
“other”category 
Because Big Pharma controls so much of the manufacturing and 
distribution expenses, there is much more room for abuse. As such, 
this cost category should be on the same side of the ratio as the 
profits (the “other” side). This way, these expenses would cut into 
the profit allowance, as they do now. If these expenses were on the 
“other” side, the incentive would continue to be to run an efficient 
supply chain, thus minimizing expenditures instead of building 
them up.202 Currently, companies cut manufacturing expenditures 
because it saves them money.203 Profit maximization—and few 
other strong forces—usually impose maximum limits on labor 
costs, ingredients, or other manufacturing expenses.204 Therefore, it 
is possible that assigning this category to the medical loss side of 
the ratio would eliminate the only incentive to run an efficient 
supply chain. 
Assigning manufacturing and distribution expenses to the 
medical loss side will, in fact, weaken or remove the companies’ 
incentive to minimize these expenses. Again, the MLR regulation 
would require a company to limit its profits and “other” expenses 
to a certain ratio based on the “medical loss.” If the “other” 
expenses, including profits, exceeded an amount that was pro-
portionate to the “medical loss” or value provided to the consumer, 
then the company would be required to refund the excess back to 
the consumer. Therefore, a Big Pharma CEO seeking to increase her 
allowable profits could simply increase her medical loss side, such 
as workers’ salaries or the amount of ingredients purchased. That 
way, as the value (“medical loss”) side of the ratio grows, so does 
the lesser-value (“other”) side, including profits. And considering 
 
 202. Tuan Nguyen, 6 Ways to Get Smart and Cut Manufacturing Costs, MANUFACTURING 
TRANSFORMATION (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.apriso.com/blog/2014/01/6-ways-to-get 
-smart-and-cut-manufacturing-costs (suggesting that manufacturing intelligence solutions 
“can help executives better manage their manufacturing assets in a way that meets customer 
demand and might actually also help a company to save some money”). 
 203. See Merck Closing 8 Plants, 8 Research Sites, supra note 200 (“Those cuts are intended 
to save the Whitehouse Station, N.J., company about $3.5 billion a year starting in 2012. 
Merck said Thursday the restructuring plans announced so far will bring savings of about 
$2.7 billion to $3.1 billion in 2012, most of its target.”). 
 204. See Nguyen, supra note 202. 
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all the control that drug companies have over distribution, and all 
the middlemen and contracts in this supply chain, there is ample 
opportunity to drive manufacturing and distribution costs up—an 
opportunity largely unavailable to health insurers whose medical 
claims payouts are heavily regulated. This heavy claim regulation 
limits what hospitals and doctors can collect and, therefore, limits 
the medical claims paid out by insurance companies, which there-
fore limits the insurance companies’ eligible profits. However, 
there is little regulation to limit what drug companies can pay out 
for the ingredients or labor required to manufacture and distribute 
medication. And if drug companies voluntarily shrink their manu-
facturing and distribution costs, they also shrink their allowable 
profits. Thus, by assigning this cost category to the “medical loss” 
side, pharmaceutical companies would lose the incentive to run 
factories and supply chains efficiently.  
The reality of this problem is readily illustrated by analogy to 
the current U.S. healthcare spending crisis, which was caused in 
large part by the way hospitals were historically paid: the cost-plus 
payment model. 205 The cost-plus payment structure reimbursed 
hospitals for the cost of care they provided plus a certain percentage 
on top.206 As a result, by 1980 hospitals had lost the incentive to 
minimize costs.207 Hospital management groups, looking to earn 
bigger profits, manipulated reimbursements by simply inflating 
their expenditures.208 Drug companies could easily make parallel 
moves if such a system were adopted. For instance, if manufac-
turing and distribution costs are counted as medical loss, then 
wasting batches of medications and charging excessive fees by 
 
 205. Elizabeth Teisberg, Michael E. Porter & Gregory B. Brown, Making Competition 
Work in Healthcare, HARV. BUS. REV. (July–Aug. 1994), https://hbr.org/1994/07/making 
-competition-in-health-care-work (“Beginning in the post-World War II period, hospitals were 
reimbursed on a cost-plus basis, which in turn produced rapidly escalating hospital costs.”). 
 206. RICHARD E. MCDERMOTT & KEVIN D. STOCKS, CODE BLUE 61 (3d ed. 2002) (“Before 
1984, most insurance plans paid hospitals their billed charges less a nominal discount. 
Medicare and many Medicaid plans paid cost-plus. Hospitals were reimbursed actual costs, 
plus a markup for profit.”). 
 207. LINDA GORMAN, THE HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE COSTS AND HEALTH INSURANCE 9 
(2006), https://www.westandfirm.org/docs/Gorman-01.pdf (“The three reimbursement 
methods used by the [Blue Cross Organizations] did not create normal business incentives. 
They assumed that all hospital costs should be paid whether or not they were generated by 
an inefficient organization. For the nonprofit [Blue Cross Organizations], a reduction in costs 
reduced the amount of revenue collected.”). 
 208. See id. 
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pharmacy benefit management companies could become real 
investment strategies for the pharmaceutical industry—especially 
if such budget increases could justify expansion of the marketing 
budget to sell more drugs and make more profits. 
However, the analogy to the cost-plus payment model is imper-
fect, and any problems created by categorizing manufacturing and 
distribution costs as medical loss may be offset by potential 
benefits. Indeed, creating incentives to inflate costs might result in 
pharmaceutical cost-increasing measures that are actually pro-
competitive. Hypothetically, drug production could immigrate to 
more expensive areas like the United States, resulting in job 
creation and economic stimulation. If this MLR regulation ends up 
mirroring the cost-plus payment model by placing this cost 
category on the “medical loss” side and thus flipping the current 
incentive to cut costs and maximize profits, it would drive up 
manufacturing costs—in effect robbing the consumer of the very 
value the MLR regulation tries to ensure.  
One of the biggest differences between enacting an MLR 
regulation and the cost-plus payment model is that, unlike the 
blank check of “plus” returns that the government promised 
hospitals, pharmaceutical companies would not be guaranteed a 
“plus” or margin. In other words, they would not get a guaranteed 
check for every expense; rather, this MLR regulation proposal 
guarantees only that drug companies could keep a limited amount 
of their profits that they have garnered themselves, in proportion 
with their medical loss expenses. Consequently, pharmaceutical 
companies would still have to organize their expenses to remain 
financially solvent. Similarly, health insurers under the MLR 
regulation have not received a blank check for all their expenses. 
Like the health insurers who fled the “money-losing” individual 
marketplace for more profitable services, Big Pharma would likely 
shed any money-draining manufacturing and distribution pro-
cesses in favor of the ones that can turn a profit. 209 They would 
never choose to spend so much in manufacturing and distribution 
that they would lose money overall. But at the same time, these 
companies could still spend a little extra on one supply contract, 
pay their distributors a little more in one area, and everything 
 
 209. See Sommer, supra note 23. 
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would add up to increase their expenses (and thus their allowable 
profits) without draining their coffers. Again, drug companies exert 
much more control over this expense category, and there is ample 
room to drive up costs enough to balloon their profits right where 
they want them.  
In sum, the decision of which side to assign manufacturing and 
distribution costs comes down to how much power drug compa-
nies have over their costs and reimbursement rates and, therefore, 
the potential for abuse. The drug companies’ control over costs de-
serves additional study. Although, given reported 17% annual 
price hikes, it seems drug companies exert at least some significant 
control over their reimbursements. But outside forces also play a 
role in influencing rates. Exactly what the balance is between all 
these forces remains to be determined, but it is clear that Big 
Pharma has significant control over this cost category, and any new 
incentives should limit the probable abuse. Regardless, categor-
izing manufacturing and distribution expenses as “medical loss” 
does nothing to reduce the country’s overall healthcare costs—a 
main goal of this proposal. 
3. Alternative options to align incentives 
If manufacturing and distribution costs are categorized as 
medical loss, other regulatory measures could help to keep drug 
prices within a manageable range. That is, some value-enhancing 
measures could limit the drug companies’ ability to increase 
manufacturing costs for the sole purpose of growing the medical 
loss side of the equation and, by extension, profit eligibility. 
Clearly, infusing price transparency and other free market forces 
into this industry to manage drug prices should be a priority. But 
for the reasons enumerated above, this is not always possible.210 
Incentivizing reduction of manufacturing and distributions costs 
would help correct the market where price transparency and other 
normal market forces could not be achieved. 
 
 210. See supra Section II.A.2. 
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Price regulation is one proven method of controlling costs.211 
This type of regulation could prevent the unnecessary ratcheting 
up of manufacturing and supply-chain costs. Moreover, if an MLR 
regulation were enacted, it is likely that companies would be less 
inclined to fight against such price controls since profits would be 
more constricted regardless. Price controls or other guidelines sur-
rounding production expenses could allow manufacturing and 
distribution costs to stay on the medical loss side of the ratio while 
still ensuring value. And evidence suggests that a reduction in 
production costs will increase expenses in R&D—a potential 
double win.212 
There are, however, potential issues with adopting traditional 
price controls. These include (1) pushing prices so far below nat-
ural levels that talent and investor capital leave the market, (2) the 
inability of fixed prices to respond to changes in markets or costs, 
(3) the risk that lengthy political discussions or formulas adjusted 
per the bias of an agency would cause implementation delays of the 
set prices, (4) possible excess supply or demand that the market 
itself cannot correct, and (5) perverse incentives such as quality 
reduction by those looking to cut costs.213 Given these issues, 
traditional price controls are probably not the answer to preventing 
abuse in the manufacturing cost category. 
Alternative options could counteract some of these cost-raising 
incentives. One option is to borrow again from the ACA’s MLR 
regulation and mandate public reporting of cost hikes of ten 
percent or more in this category.214 Setting a cap for these hikes is 
 
 211. France has seen the growth in its medication costs slow (2.1% in 2008, 2% in 2009, 
1.1% in 2010) due to reduced reimbursements and regulated price reductions. Annie Fenina 
et al., Les Comptes Nationaux de la Santé en 2010, ÉTUDES ET RESULTATS, Sept. 2011, at 1, 
http://drees.social-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/er773-2.pdf. 
 212. See Basu et al., supra note 29. 
 213. Fiona M. Scott Morton, The Problems of Price Controls, 24 REGULATION 50, 50–
51 (2001). 
 214. See PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 18 (indicating an insurance carrier 
must publicly explain premium rate increases at rates of 10% or more through rate review); 
Fighting Unreasonable Health Insurance Premium Increases, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/ratereview05192
011 a.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (“Under the final regulation: Starting September 1, 2011, 
insurers seeking rate increases of 10 percent or more for non-grandfathered plans in the 
individual and small group markets are required to publicly disclose the proposed increases 
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another option. Alternatively, government oversight could be in-
creased to ensure fair valuation. Capping aggregated reimburse-
ments (think capitated payments) would mean that intentional 
waste (e.g., batches of faulty medicine, unnecessary contract raises) 
would still cut into a pharmaceutical company’s profits and hope-
fully minimize this unwanted behavior. It is also possible that 
competing players could provide the needed competition to keep 
pharmaceutical manufacturers running lean, such as Intermoun-
tain Healthcare’s upcoming nonprofit generic drug company.215 Yet 
it is unlikely that even this type of competition would help reduce 
prices of patented, brand-name drugs.216 
Moving manufacturing and distribution expenses to the 
“other” side of the MLR ratio might be the best way to incentivize 
reducing waste. If manufacturing were to be lumped with “other” 
expenses, then those costs would cut into profits—and Big 
Pharma’s incentives would be aligned with reducing waste—just 
like they do currently. Big Pharma CEOs would squeeze everything 
on that side of the ratio to expand the profits section as much as 
possible. It would encourage efficiency in manufacturing, as do 
current market forces. This would also eliminate much of the 
arbitrariness associated with traditional price controls while still 
restricting prices to accentuate value. Instead of depending on price 
regulation based on lagging or even random data, prices could 
fluctuate naturally with expenses and innovation while still leaving 
a reasonable profit margin. Logically, the “other” section should be 
expanded to include manufacturing expenses. 
4. Manufacturing and distribution expenses should be classified 
as “other” 
Manufacturing and distribution expenses should be on the 
“other” side of the Medical Loss Ratio. Admittedly, this category 
 
and the justification for them. Such increases will be reviewed by either State or Federal 
experts to determine whether they are unreasonable.”). 
 215. Reed Abelson & Katie Thomas, Fed Up with Drug Companies, Hospitals Decide to 
Start Their Own, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/health 
/drug-prices-hospitals.html. 
 216. Beth Jones Sanborn, Intermountain-Led Generic Drug Venture Faces Big Hurdles, 
Could Forge New Regulatory and Political Ground, HEALTHCARE FINANCE (Mar. 15, 2018), 
http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/intermountain-led-generic-drug-venture 
-faces-big-hurdles-could-forge-new-regulatory-and. 
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provides value to the consumer in that this category actually 
produces and delivers the life-changing or life-enhancing drugs to 
the consumer. And the costs are substantial—like insurance 
payouts. But assigning manufacturing and distribution expenses to 
the “other” side would be the best insurance against abuse and 
provide the most value to the consumer. Furthermore, like the 
health insurance industry, Big Pharma does not have a guaranteed 
“cost-plus” profit in proportion to manufacturing expenditures. 
The reimbursements would not be automatic the way they were for 
hospitals under the cost-plus payment model. As a final note, when 
calculating the rebates, it will be important to exclude any 
manufacturing expenses from Big Pharma’s non-pharmaceutical 
areas (household goods, information management arms, etc.) from 
the manufacturing and distribution directly related to drugs. In 
conclusion, the manufacturing and distribution category is 
valuable medical loss. Yet, given the incentives that would result if 
this were assigned to the “medical loss” side of the ratio, more 
value is preserved if this category is assigned to the “other” side of 
the ratio. Further inquiry and careful analysis in this area are 
strongly urged. 
C. Lawsuits Are “Medical Loss” 
Under the insurance MLR regulation, the medical loss side is 
adjusted by certain funds set aside as reserves.217 One allotment of 
reserve money is specifically for potential future lawsuits.218 These 
funds are counted as part of the medical loss, per the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC) and Department of 
Health and Human Services’ (HHS) recommendations.219 Although 
this “value” designation could incentivize Big Pharma to open 
themselves up for lawsuits, lawsuit reserves should be allocated to 
the medical loss side, given the realities of this industry and 
pending different recommendations from HHS. 
 
 217. See KIRCHHOFF, supra note 29. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See id. 
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D. Research and Development Is “Medical Loss” 
Drug companies’ constant refrain is, essentially, “only an attrac-
tive return on investment will entice the capital necessary to fund 
world-changing breakthroughs.”220 Indeed, capital is funneled into 
the drug industry, at least in part, because of the substantial 
financial returns.221 And to be sure, pharmaceutical breakthroughs 
are medical loss. Developments in this area mean people live longer 
and healthier lives, sometimes with fewer medical costs.222 In fact, 
the resulting discoveries from all that American capital differ-
entiate this country’s drug innovation from that of others.223 
American pharmaceutical innovation is second to none. If R&D 
were further incentivized under an MLR regulation, Big Pharma 
might even turn additional attention to unprofitable, but badly 
needed, neglected drugs. Thus, promoting the value inherent in 
this category is vital. 
Yet theoretically, there is still room for abuse. Drug companies 
could certainly throw money into research for the sake of increasing 
this side of the ratio without any real advancements. Currently, 
annual projected Big Pharma R&D returns on investment are down 
 
 220. See Lydia Ramsey, Pharma Companies’ No. 1 Justification for High Drug Prices Is 
Bogus, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2015, 12:53 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/research 
-and-development-costs-might-not-factor-into-drug-pricing-2015-12 (“Pharmaceutical com-
panies often cite the cost of researching and developing new compounds as the reason for 
their high drug prices.”); Williams, supra note 7. 
 221. See Williams, supra note 7. 
 222. The Value of Medical Innovation: An Overview, HEALTHCARE INST. N.J. (last updated 
Aug. 29, 2017), http://hinj.org/value-of-medical-innovation (“Globally, between 1960 and 
1997, new therapies accounted for 45 percent of the increase in life expectancy in 30 
developing and high-income countries. . . . New therapies have contributed to a nearly 
22 percent decline in cancer deaths since the 1990s. U.S. cancer survivorship alone has more 
than tripled since 1970, with nearly 14.5 million cancer survivors alive in the country last 
year. . . . The HIV/AIDS death rate has dropped nearly 85 percent since the introduction of 
highly active antiretroviral treatment (HAART) in 1995.”). 
 223. Elizabeth Whitman, How the U.S. Subsidizes Cheap Drugs for Europe, INT’L BUS. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-us-subsidizes-cheap-drugs 
-europe-2112662 (“The U.S. accounted for 46 percent of global life sciences research and 
development—the vast majority of which is in biopharmaceuticals—according to the 
December 2013 issue of R&D Magazine. ‘The U.S. is the global leader in biomedical 
innovation,’ Mark Grayson, a spokesman for PhRMA, a pharmaceutical industry trade 
group that represents many of the world’s biggest drug companies, said in an email.”). 
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to 3.2%.224 An MLR regulation might, in practice, encourage waste 
in research funds. Big Pharma could find a myriad of ways to prop 
up these expenses. For example, more drugs might begin to 
perform overlapping functions without real differentiated value 
from each other—with their development costs all ascribed to 
“R&D.” Production costs might shift even more to the expensive 
American labor force.225 Big Pharma could push for greater FDA 
scrutiny to rack up costs in this category. And drug companies 
could purposefully keep drugs in the development stage longer. 
For these reasons R&D, like manufacturing costs, might belong on 
the “other” side. 
However, R&D ultimately belongs with the medical loss. 
Again, unlike in the cost-plus payment model, there would be a 
check on these expenditures—the need to maintain a profit. Not all 
research leads to substantial discoveries, so there is no guaranteed 
return in this investment area. Furthermore, a drug cannot begin to 
return a profit until it has passed the FDA gate.226 Thus, drug 
companies would still push for minimal, not more, costly FDA 
intervention. Stockholder considerations, pressure for substantial 
breakthroughs, and public perception would all encourage efficient 
R&D. And importantly, this might incentivize development of ne-
glected drugs that otherwise would not return a profit. With the 
value and controls inherent in this category, R&D should ultimate-
ly stay on the medical loss side. 
 
 224. A New Future for R&D? Measuring the Return from Pharmaceutical Innovation 2017, 
DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/life-sciences-and-healthcare/articles 
/measuring-return-from-pharmaceutical-innovation.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
 225. Vanessa Fuhrmans & Scott Hensley, Drug Makers Are More Vocal Against Europe’s 
Price Controls, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 13, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1008191144 
635615520. 
 226. See Development & Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https:// 
www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/ (last updated Jan. 16, 2018) (“American 
consumers benefit from having access to the safest and most advanced pharmaceutical 
system in the world. The main consumer watchdog in this system is FDA’s Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research (CDER). The center’s best-known job is to evaluate new drugs 
before they can be sold. CDER’s evaluation not only prevents quackery, but also provides 
doctors and patients the information they need to use medicines wisely. The center ensures 
that drugs, both brand-name and generic, work correctly and that their health benefits 
outweigh their known risks.”). 
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E. Taxes, Fees, and Depreciation Are “Medical Loss” 
In insurance MLR regulation, taxes, as well as regulatory or 
licensing fees, are considered medical loss.227 However, federal 
income taxes on investment income and capital gains (profit from 
a sale or investment) are not.228 Here, taxes and fees are similarly 
set by outside forces, such as government regulations.229 As a result, 
penalizing companies for paying these costs does not make sense. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Big Pharma will advocate for an 
increased tax rate. The incentives are already sufficient to keep 
these costs low; no artificial incentives are required. Depreciation 
of property and other assets can be calculated using various 
methods.230 Some uniform way of measuring this should be esta-
blished to prevent one drug company from obtaining an unfair 
advantage over the others. These categories can all be grouped 
similarly to their counterparts in the insurance industry on the 
medical loss side. 
F. Marketing Is “Other” 
This subsection argues that although advertising drug infor-
mation does result in valuable informed consumerism, assigning 
marketing to the medical loss side of the MLR ratio creates perverse 
incentives for drug companies. In general, the staggering financial 
returns from marketing investment are too high for drug com-
panies not to want to flood this category with cash. The incentives 
would be especially counterproductive because the greater their 
profit allowance grows, the more they would spend on advertising. 
Instead, marketing should be categorized as “other,” thereby incen-
tivizing drug companies to minimize marketing expenses.  
 
 227. See Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), supra note 26. 
 228. See id. 
 229. Topic Number: 409—Capital Gains and Losses, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics 
/tc409 (last updated Mar. 13, 2018). 
 230. Ben McClure, An Introduction to Depreciation, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest 
opedia.com/articles/fundamental/04/090804.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
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1. Promoting awareness of medications is valuable 
Valid arguments suggest that marketing should be categorized 
as medical loss. In an era of increased transparency, consumers 
want to be empowered and educated about drugs.231 They want to 
sit down with their physicians and have informed conversations.232 
But if physicians are unaware of a particular drug, they will not 
prescribe it and patients cannot gain access to it. Thus, promoting 
awareness of beneficial treatments through marketing is val-
uable.233 Furthermore, there is merit to the drug makers’ claim that 
unless they see attractive profits, investments in R&D will drop. 
And the best way to turn a profit is to advertise the product.234  
Moreover, informal controls play a minimal role in reducing 
marketing expenses, supporting the position that they should be 
considered medical loss. Consumers along both party lines advo-
cate for reductions in drug prices, while the media publicizes the 
excesses.235 Additionally, the pot of revenue is somewhat finite, and 
marketing funds have to come from somewhere. Furthermore, if 
the MLR regulation is enacted and profits are limited to a reason-
able rate, there may not be the same pressure to engage in profit-
 
 231. NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., THE HEALTHCARE IMPERATIVE: LOWERING 
COSTS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES: WORKSHOP SERIES SUMMARY (2010), https://www.ncbi 
.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK53921. 
 232. See Horovitz & Appleby, supra note 166 (“Reis said her mother did take the Lyrica 
‘and it’s helped.’ That’s a good thing, says the brand guru who takes pride in looking out for 
her mom. ‘The ad spurred the conversation.’”). 
 233. Russell Huebsch, What Are the Benefits of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising?, HEARST 
NEWSPAPERS, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/benefits-direct-to-consumer-advertising-3587 
.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (“The 2004 study showed that DTCA ads were especially 
helpful in getting low-income families to seek medical care. Low-income individuals and fa-
milies are typically the hardest demographic to reach for any public awareness campaign.”). 
 234. Robert Pear, Marketing Tied to Increase in Prescription Drug Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
20, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/20/us/marketing-tied-to-increase-in-prescrip 
tion-drug-sales.html (‘‘Sales of these drugs contributed powerfully to the steep increase in 
prescription drug spending in 1999.’’). 
 235. Mary Ellen McIntire, Republicans Eye Boosting Competition to Help Trump Lower 
Drug Prices, MORNING CONSULT (Dec. 9, 2016), https://morningconsult.com/2016/12/09 
/republicans-eye-boosting-competition-help-trump-lower-drug-prices (“President-elect 
Donald Trump says he wants to lower drug prices, an idea that’s been pushed primarily by 
Democrats but has support from some key GOP senators.”); Petersen, supra note 8 (“The 
companies raised prices—not to fund research to discover new drugs—but to boost profits 
for executives and investors.”); Ransdell Pierson & Bill Berkrot, Democrats Take Aim at Drug 
Prices, Prompting Sharp Drops in Biotech Stocks, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2015, 6:30 PM), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-valeant-pharms-congress/democrats-take-aim-at-drug-prices 
-prompting-sharp-drops-in-biotech-stocks-idUSKCN0RS28N20150929. 
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maximizing marketing. Enacting the MLR regulation could nat-
urally reduce these expenses. However, despite these potential 
benefits, other concerns suggest marketing should be assigned to 
the “other” side. 
2. Marketing should be classified as “other” to align incentives 
Linking increased marketing expenses to increased profits by 
putting marketing on the medical loss side of the ratio would only 
exacerbate current problems. A Big Pharma CEO faced with man-
aging huge profit cuts would start looking at her levers. The last 
thing she would do is pull the lever that shrinks the “other” side of 
the ratio—her allowed profits—any more than she absolutely must. 
If her marketing expenditures are considered medical loss, then she 
would be prone to ratchet them up. Unlike the individual market-
place, advertising is not “money losing.” The return on advertising 
investment is substantial. If these expenditures started producing 
profits that exceeded the imposed ratio threshold, the CEO would 
find a legitimate channel for those extra funds. Most likely she 
would move them into R&D. But it is highly improbable that she 
would voluntarily reduce any medical-loss-qualifying expendi-
tures because that would cut her overall allowable profit amount—
which she’s already losing. Instead, she would likely continue to 
channel funds into potentially wasteful marketing expenses that 
would continue to dwarf the R&D expenditures, effectively rob-
bing value from consumers. The effects would be almost identical 
to the effects of the cost-plus payment model: The more the CEO 
spends on marketing, the more profits she is guaranteed. Overall, 
drug prices would not drop as desired if marketing expenses were 
considered to be medical loss. 
Instead, categorizing marketing costs as “other” would incen-
tivize minimizing advertising expenditures while still spending 
enough to attract a profit. This Note does not propose slashing 
marketing to cram it with profits into a twenty percent limit. How-
ever, categorizing marketing as “other” effectively incentivizes 
waste reduction in this area. It could significantly reduce direct-to-
consumer advertising without outright banning it. This type of 
advertising could drop to a reasonable level, which would result in 
less pressure on physicians from advertisement-prepped patients 
to prescribe unnecessary treatment. Since there is such an influ-
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ential return on marketing investment, the only genuine outside 
force on marketing expenditures is its detraction from profits.236 
Removing this link would seriously frustrate the effort to reduce 
unnecessary marketing and its associated waste. It is therefore im-
perative that these expenditures be condensed. Marketing belongs 
on the “other” side of the MLR ratio. 
G. Community Benefit Expenditures Are “Medical Loss” 
In some ways, public health education campaigns and other 
community benefit expenditures are like marketing. They increase 
awareness of a product and promote sales.237 Consequently, some 
might argue that such expenditures are no better than advertising; 
they are just pharmaceutical propaganda for drugs. However, the 
material can provide substantial value to the public—similar to the 
value noted above in the marketing section (IV.F).238 Given the 
material’s similar nature to advertising, it would make sense to 
combine this with marketing. But as long as community benefit 
expenditures are defined narrowly as educational initiatives—as 
they are in the health insurance ratio regulation—and exclude 
purely promotional initiatives, this can be medical loss. 
H. Salaries and Agent Commissions Are “Other” 
The purpose of a for-profit business is to make a profit.239 Larger 
profits thus equate to more success. Competitive salespersons’ and 
agents’ salaries, along with attractive commissions, are critical to 
effectively managing resources and creating this profit.240 In 
 
 236. See Pear, supra note 234. 
 237. See Public Health Campaigns that Change Minds, MILKEN INST. SCH. PUB. HEALTH 
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://publichealthonline.gwu.edu/blog/health-communication-campaigns/ 
(“How do you motivate an individual to quit smoking? Persuade a community to vaccinate 
their children? Incentivize a whole nation to eat better? These types of questions are at the 
heart of every health communication campaign, which aim to change how people think 
about their health and simultaneously provide them with the resources and incentives to 
improve it.”). 
 238. See id. 
 239. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 70 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (discussing the 
shareholder primacy norm). 
 240. DAVID A. BJORK, HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: A GUIDE FOR LEADERS 
AND TRUSTEES 3 (2012) (“Hospitals may be tax-exempt charities serving the public good, but 
they are still big, complicated businesses with narrow profit margins, and they need talented 
executives to keep them strong. Tax exemption and public funding for Medicare and 
Medicaid have no bearing on what it costs to recruit and retain executives.”). 
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general, salary incentives produce results. Thus, both outside and 
inside forces urge maximizing this category. Ultimately, salaries, 
including those of pharmacy benefit managers, should be expan-
sive enough to attract talent but contained enough to encourage 
efficiency (while avoiding extreme profit-taking). Salaries should 
fall on the “other” side. 
I. Administrative Expenses Are “Other” 
The administrative expenses category contemplates office 
expenses such as rent, utilities, supplies, and administrative per-
sonnel. These expenses provide relatively little value to the drug 
consumer. Therefore, encouraging efficiency, quality, and thrift is 
important here. In order to minimize waste in this area, admini-
strative costs should be categorized as “other” and left out of the 
medical loss category. 
J. Exceptions to Consider 
There are exceptions to the 80:20 rule in the health insurance 
industry for a reason.241 Similarly, some pharmaceutical companies 
do not follow the standard Big Pharma model. Some companies 
lack the funds or infrastructure for major R&D.242 Others require 
only a modest marketing budget. Exceptions should be made per 
the various business models. There should be room for some 
reasonable flexibility. 
K. Ratio Should Be 40:60 
Imposing an overall MLR ratio, like the 80:20 ratio in the 
insurance industry, could reduce drug prices while reserving to 
pharmaceutical companies control over pricing and budget details. 
With a similar overall ratio, these companies would have the 
flexibility to choose to spend more on advertising and keep less for 
 
 241. See Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), supra note 26. For other 
insurance designs, the ratio is flexible so as to facilitate financial viability. See id. For example, 
Special Circumstances Adjustments apply to newer plans, min-med plans, and expatriate 
plans to address individual insurance situations. Low-enrollment insurers are similarly held 
to different ratios to adjust for less predictability in claims expenses. Alternatively, if em-
ployers wish to self-insure and avoid paying the “non-value” margins to an insurance 
company, they are not subject to the MLR regulation requirement. See id. 
 242. See id. 
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profits, or vice versa. However, as described above, pharmaceutical 
companies have greater power to increase the costs of production. 
Thus, a mixed ratio might better achieve the main goal of targeting 
value. A specific profit percentage cap, such as 12% (the next high-
est industry’s average profits), combined with an overall medical 
loss ratio like 70:30, could provide a helpful general framework, 
leaving Big Pharma flexibility over the details. 
Again, Big Pharma currently averages 21% in profits.243 A 12% 
profit margin seems reasonable and competitive. After adding sales 
and marketing (currently 23%; ideally, it should match other in-
dustries’ 10% average), manufacturing and distribution costs (30%), 
as well as administrative costs, salaries and commissions, etc., the 
“other” portion of the ratio could approach 60%, which would 
leave 40% for medical loss. Similar to what has happened to the 
insurance industry, Big Pharma has the potential to rebate billions 
of dollars back to Americans, easing the increases in prescription 
prices.244 Players in the pharmaceutical industry might even tighten 
their belts and squeeze out costs that don’t add value to con-
sumers—all while making a reasonable margin of profit—just like 
insurers. Admittedly, this ratio would benefit from a more detailed 
economic analysis that could arrive at a more calculated ratio, 
adjustable as the market fluctuates. 
V. CONCLUSION: REDUCED TAXPAYER BURDEN, 
INCREASED AFFORDABILITY 
Where should the refunds go when pharmaceutical profits 
exceed the 12% cap, or if the “other” category oversteps 60%? The 
health insurance industry rebates their excess to individuals and 
corporations.245 Yet for pharmaceutical companies without easily 
accessible means to rebate consumers, issuing rebates to indivi-
duals and corporations likely would be too complicated and 
burdensome. However, there is another potential way to channel 
these funds to lower insurance premiums (which is perhaps a more 
 
 243. See Williams, supra note 7. 
 244. See PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 18. 
 245. See The 80/20 Rule: Providing Value and Rebates to Millions of Customers, supra note 
187 (“The 80/20 rule is ensuring that insurance companies provide consumers value for their 
premium dollars.”). 
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widespread pain point worth addressing). At first, the government 
could collect and distribute this money to reimburse the still-
unfunded ACA risk corridors that were  intended to be operational 
in the initial years of the ACA’s implementation.246 This would 
relieve taxpayers of their $8 billion debt still owed to insurance 
companies.247 After that bill is paid, the funds could then be 
distributed evenly to insurers on an ongoing basis in a way that 
extends the ACA’s reinsurance payments and spreads out savings 
to the consumers.248 Since insurance companies have their own 
value-driving MLR, premium price growth could slow and—dare 
we hope—slightly reverse. This type of regulation could defray 
individual and family healthcare expenditures, increasing afford-
ability for all. If this result is unpalatable then these funds could be 
channeled toward other worthwhile endeavors—such as funding 
nursing or doctor scholarships or helping provide insurance for 
those with disabilities. 
This proposal might have other advantages as well. Big Pharma 
might move drug production jobs to the United States in an attempt 
to lever up production costs and thus their profit eligibility. Drug 
companies might finally shift the R&D cost burden from the United 
States by lowering prices in America while keeping prices abroad 
fixed.249 Some may argue that markets eventually find ways around 
 
 246. See Livingston, supra note 37. 
 247. See id. 
 248. See Cynthia Cox, Ashley Semanskee, Gary Claxton & Larry Levitt, Explaining 
Health Care Reform: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. 6 (2016), http://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-care-re 
form-risk-adjustment-reinsurance-and-risk-corridors (“Reinsurance differs from risk adjust-
ment in that reinsurance is meant to stabilize premiums by reducing the incentive for 
insurers to charge higher premiums due to concerns about higher-risk people enrolling early 
in the program, whereas risk adjustment is meant to stabilize premiums by mitigating the 
effects of risk selection across plans. Thus, reinsurance payments are only made to individual 
market plans that are subject to new market rules (e.g., guaranteed issue), whereas risk 
adjustment payments are made to both individual and small group plans. Additionally, 
reinsurance payments are based on actual costs, whereas risk adjustment payments are 
based on expected costs. As reinsurance is based on actual rather than predicted costs, 
reinsurance payments will also account for low-risk individuals who may have unexpectedly 
high costs (such as costs incurred due to an accident or sudden onset of an illness). . . . 
[R]einsurance payments represent a net flow of dollars into the individual market, in effect 
subsidizing premiums in that market.”). 
 249. See Mc Govern, supra note 67 (“[T]he European Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industries and Associations released a report on the pharmaceutical industry. In this report, 
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this type of price regulation with reduced efficiencies and 
quality.250 But perhaps reduced efficiency is precisely what we 
want—at least in the realm of stockholder return-on-investment 
efficiency. While neglected drug R&D provides relatively little 
financial reward to an investor, if drug companies were somehow 
incentivized to raise their R&D expenditures, then perhaps much-
needed (albeit unprofitable) drugs might become more available to 
non-financial stakeholders such as patients and their families. 
Ironically, this type of inefficiency could result in value for patients, 
who are the ones really in need. And any measures drug companies 
might take to reduce quality can be managed by the FDA.251 
In conclusion, an MLR regulation could provide much-needed 
value to the pharmaceutical industry in ways that the current 
market structure fails to do. Ultimately, however, more thorough 
analysis is needed to identify the optimal ratio and category 
classification for each expense category. But in the current push to 
expedite healthcare affordability and access, a pharmaceutical MLR 
regulation could provide the much-needed guardrail to facilitate 
maximum value for American healthcare consumers. 
 
Cami R. Schiel* 
  
 
it was revealed Europe accounted for 22.2 percent of all pharmaceutical sales of 2015, while 
the US took 48.7 percent of the margin.”). 
 250. See Morton, supra note 33 (“[P]rice controls, in combination with government 
requisitioning and corruption, created chaos in the French economy. Merchants responded 
by reducing the quality of their goods and the black market blossomed, Bourne noted. ‘It 
was the honest merchant who became the victim of the law.’”). 
 251. See Development & Approval Process (Drugs), supra note 226 (“American consumers 
benefit from having access to the safest and most advanced pharmaceutical system in the 
world. The main consumer watchdog in this system is FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation 
and Research (CDER). The center’s best-known job is to evaluate new drugs before they can 
be sold. CDER’s evaluation not only prevents quackery, but also provides doctors and 
patients the information they need to use medicines wisely. The center ensures that drugs, 
both brand-name and generic, work correctly and that their health benefits outweigh their 
known risks.”). 
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